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We live in troubled times, with competing political camps acting like op-
posing tribes. We live in separate enclaves, get our information from sepa-
rate sources, and remain inside our own information bubbles. We should
bear these divisions in mind as we discuss possible changes to our system
of electing the President.
The year 2020 began with a presidential impeachment trial, featured at
its midpoint a Supreme Court decision holding that a state may require its
presidential electors to vote in accordance with that state’s popular vote,
and will end with a presidential election. Many think that we should scrap
electors and use a national popular vote. One proposed method is the Na-
tional Popular Vote Compact. The idea is to guarantee that the winner of
the national popular vote would win the electoral vote: states joining the
Compact agree that once jurisdictions with a majority of the electoral votes
join the Compact, they will cast their electoral votes for the national popu-
lar vote winner.
This Article argues that, in today’s hyper-partisan political culture, a
presidential election using a national popular vote—particularly the Na-
tional Popular Vote Compact—invites disaster. A simplified version of a
proposal by Lawrence Lessig, however, would be a significant improve-
ment of our current system and would not run the risks posed by a national
popular vote. Replacing the winner-take-all allocation with proportional
allocation of electors in each state eliminates the worst feature of our cur-
rent electoral college system and makes many more voters relevant in a
presidential election. It also preserves state control over elections, making it
harder for would-be authoritarians to entrench themselves.
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I. INTRODUCTION
WE live in troubled times, with competing political camps actinglike opposing tribes. We live in separate enclaves, get our in-formation from separate sources, and remain inside our own
information bubbles, distrusting and disparaging information from the
other side’s sources. Bad faith is presumed, and efforts at compromise are
treated as weakness. We regard each other as existential threats to the
nation and enemies to be vanquished—to the point where intermarriage
is taboo.
Overcoming these divisions may be the central political and cultural
task of our time. But this Article’s ambition is far less grand. Instead, this
Article argues that we should bear these divisions in mind as we discuss
possible changes to our system of electing the President.
This year has already featured a presidential impeachment trial and a
Supreme Court decision regarding whether state legislatures can control
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not only how presidential electors are selected but also how they vote. It
also, of course, features a presidential election. Two of the last five presi-
dential elections have been won by candidates who lost the national pop-
ular vote, and it may happen again this year.1 And it is possible that the
November election will be conducted during a resurgence of the
coronavirus, with a severity that varies widely across the nation.2
Many think that we should move to the direct election of the President
by popular vote. Fifteen states, plus the District of Columbia, have en-
acted the National Popular Vote Compact, under which the electoral
votes of those jurisdictions that enact it would be awarded to the winner
of the national popular vote.3 By its terms, the compact would not take
effect until jurisdictions with a majority of the electoral votes had enacted
it; so far, the enacting jurisdictions have 196 of the 270 needed.4 The idea
is to guarantee that the winner of the national popular vote would win the
electoral vote; once jurisdictions with a majority of the electoral votes
enacted it, their votes would control the election.
Meanwhile, Professor Lawrence Lessig advocated for a Supreme Court
decision holding that presidential electors are free to vote as they wish,
notwithstanding state laws attempting to control their votes, in the hope
that such a decision would prompt sufficient attention to make constitu-
tional reform possible.5 Lessig favors direct election; he also offers what
he considers a second-best alternative: proportional allocation of electo-
ral votes in each state.6
The Court did not oblige; instead, it unanimously held that states may
sanction presidential electors for breaching their promise to vote as an
agent of others.7
This Article argues that, in the current environment, a presidential
election using a national popular vote—particularly the National Popular
Vote Compact—courts disaster. A simplified version of the Lessig propo-
1. Tara Law, These Presidents Won the Electoral College—But Not the Popular Vote,
TIME (May 15, 2019, 4:58 PM), https://time.com/5579161/presidents-elected-electoral-col
lege/ [https://perma.cc/78DF-THES].
2. Hannah Osborne, The “Second Wave” Is Still to Come and the U.S. Has No Spe-
cific Plan to Deal With It, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 11, 2020, 7:39 AM), https://www.newsweek.
com/coronavirus-second-wave-fall-white-house-plan-1524243 [https://perma.cc/MW74-
X9UT].




5. See Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Considers Pivotal Electoral College Case, NPR
(May 13, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/13/853724211/supreme-court-consid
ers-pivotal-electoral-college-case [https://perma.cc/8QWX-XAW6].
6. Margaret M. Hylton & Austin W. Li, Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Lessig
Advocates for Changes to the Electoral College, HARV. CRIMSON (Oct. 21, 2019), https://
www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/10/21/hls-prof-advocates-for-electoral-college-change/
[https://perma.cc/RQ2B-YJ9N].
7. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328–29 (2020). Justice Kagan’s opin-
ion for the Court spoke for eight Justices; Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, joined in part by Justice Gorsuch. See id. at 2316.
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sal, however, would be a significant improvement to our current system
and would not run the risks posed by a national popular vote. What Les-
sig offers as a second-best choice, with some simplification, should be
viewed as the best choice.
II. THREE MISIMPRESSIONS
A. MISFIRES
Some describe instances in which the electoral winner did not win the
popular vote as misfires that produced the wrong winner, proclaiming
that the person who actually received the most popular votes would have
won if we elected presidents by popular vote.8
But that is a misimpression. We simply cannot know who would have
won an election had it been governed by a different set of rules any more
than we can know that the Yankees would have won the 1960 World Se-
ries if total runs scored in the series decided the winner, or that the Fal-
cons would have won Super Bowl LI if the number of quarters won
decided the winner, or that the Red Sox would have won the 1986 World
Series if the number of innings won decided the winner.9
The point of these sports analogies is not to suggest that elections are
sporting events in which the winner doesn’t really matter.10 Instead, the
point is that just as it is impossible to know who would have won the
sporting events if the rules had been different, it is impossible to know
who would have won past elections if the rules had been different.
For example, if total runs in the World Series decided the winner, man-
agers wouldn’t save certain pitchers, known as closers, for the final in-
nings of games in which they were narrowly ahead.11 If the number of
innings won decided the winner, once an inning was already lost, a
8. See, e.g., Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Major-
itarianism, and the Perils of Subconstitutional Change, 100 GEO. L.J. 173, 184–85 (2011)
(noting that “critics allege that the Electoral College has ‘misfired’”).
9. The Pirates won the series four games to three, but the Yankees scored fifty-five
runs across the seven games, while the Pirates scored only twenty-seven. 1960 World Series,
BASEBALL ALMANAC, https://www.baseball-almanac.com/ws/yr1960ws.shtml [https://
perma.cc/G7XZ-BACT]. That’s because the Pirates won four close games (6–4, 3–2, 5–2,
10–9), while the Yankees won three games by lopsided margins (16–3, 10–0, 12–0). Id. The
final score in Super Bowl LI was New England Patriots 34, Atlanta Falcons 28, but there
was no score in the first quarter. Super Bowl LI—New England Patriots vs. Atlanta Fal-
cons—February 5th, 2017, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE, https://www.pro-football-refer-
ence.com/boxscores/201702050atl.htm [https://perma.cc/23HM-WPZS]. The Falcons
outscored the Patriots in the second quarter 21–3 and in the third quarter 7–6, with the
Patriots outscoring the Falcons in the fourth quarter 19–0. (The Patriots won with a touch-
down in overtime.) Id. The Mets won the series four games to three, but the Red Sox
scored more runs in fifteen innings, while the Mets scored more runs in only twelve in-
nings. 1986 World Series, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-reference.com/
postseason/1986_WS.shtml [https://perma.cc/EF7A-7D4D].
10. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Some Thoughts on the Electoral College: Past, Present, and
Future, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 467, 472–73 (2007) (calling the sports analogies “silly” be-
cause “elections are not sporting events”).
11. Closer, MLB, http://m.mlb.com/glossary/positions/closer [https://perma.cc/QVE2-
UL7X].
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pitcher would be left in to take his lumps that inning no matter how many
runs he gave up. If the number of quarters won decided the winner in
football, clock management and play calling, particularly near the end of
a quarter, would be very different.
But it’s not just that the strategy inside a particular game would
change. Who was hired to play on a particular team would change. Of
course, some players would be hired under multiple rule variations, but
others would be hired under some rule variations but not others. And
even among those hired—and those seeking to be hired—the particular
kind of athlete they choose to develop themselves into would change. If
total runs in a series—or number of innings won in a game—determined
the winner, what would be the point of having a closer on a baseball team
anymore?
The changes wouldn’t stop with strategy and personnel. Other rules
would change as well. Surely if total runs in the series determined the
winner, a home team that was ahead would bat in the bottom of the ninth
inning. And if the number of innings with the most runs determined the
winner, maybe the home team would not bat in any inning once it won
that inning. Such a rule change would not only dramatically shorten many
games but also significantly reduce the number of hitters that a visiting
pitcher would face in many games. And such rule changes would, in turn,
likely cause changes to personnel; for example, teams might change the
ratio of pitchers to non-pitchers on their squads.
The same is true of presidential elections. If the winner were decided
by a national popular vote, campaign strategies and political platforms
would be different. Where candidates spent time and money would be
different. What issues they chose to emphasize—indeed, their positions
on issues—would be different. Advocates of a national popular vote sys-
tem sometimes tout such changes as benefits without always acknowledg-
ing that it undermines any claim about who would have won past
elections if the national popular vote had determined the winner.12
Voter behavior, including voter turnout, would change. In some places
that are currently noncompetitive, turnout might increase; in other places
that are currently battlegrounds, it might decrease. Willingness to vote for
a third-party candidate would likely change, at least to the extent that
some current voters are more willing to vote for a third-party candidate if
they are confident that their preferred major-party candidate will surely
win their state anyway.13
12. Compare JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR
ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 450 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing
how campaigning would change under a national popular vote), with id. at 455 (discussing
“wrong winner” elections). But see id. at 749 (“It is impossible to say whether Al Gore
would have been elected President in 2000 under the National Popular Vote system, be-
cause the campaign would have been conducted very differently.”).
13. See Russell Berman & Andrew McGill, The States Where Third-Party Candidates
Perform Best, ATLANTIC (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/
08/third-party-candidates-2016-clinton-trump-johnson/493931/ [https://perma.cc/5DSD-
KF29].
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Just as with sports, the changes would not be limited to strategy. Just as
the people hired to play sports would change if the rules were different,
the candidates nominated (and those who choose to run) would also
change. As with sports, some candidates would run or be nominated
under multiple sets of rules. But others would run or be nominated under
some rules but not others. And even among those who would run or be
nominated, the particular kind of politician they choose to develop them-
selves into would change. Moreover, other rules would likely change in
response.
It is a fallacy to say that Hillary Clinton in 2016, or Al Gore in 2000, or
Grover Cleveland in 1888, or Samuel Tilden in 1876, would have won if
only we elected presidents based on the national popular vote.14 We don’t
know if they would have won under that system. We don’t even know
that they would have been their party’s nominee under that system—or
who their opponents would have been under that system. One cannot
change an important part of an interconnected system and pretend that
everything else would have stayed the same.
B. DISTRICTS
It is easy to get the impression that there is something unique about the
possibility of a mismatch between the electoral vote and the popular vote.
But this is a misimpression; the possibility of a mismatch between who
prevails in an area as a whole and who prevails in each of a series of
district-based contests is inherent in the very idea of districting.15 Unless
one is prepared to condemn all district-based election systems, one has to
tolerate this possibility.
Consider a state legislature. If the seats are allocated by district, a party
can win a majority in the state as a whole but still not win a majority in
the legislature. This is obviously true if partisan gerrymandering happens,
but it can easily happen even without such gerrymandering. For instance,
it could happen even if the districts were created by an algorithm that
chose (say) the most compact equal-population districts possible and
chose randomly among any maps that tied for compactness. All that is
necessary is that one party (like the Pirates in the 1960 World Series) win
a majority of districts each by a small margin and the other party (like the
Yankees in that Series) win a minority of districts each by a large mar-
gin.16 No one gerrymandered the lines between the games of the 1960
World Series, and no one need gerrymander district lines to produce a
mismatch between the statewide vote for a party in legislative elections
and the allocation of seats in the legislature.
14. See Law, supra note 1 (discussing presidential candidates who won the popular
vote but not presidential election).
15. See Districting, ACE PROJECT, http://aceproject.org/main/english/ei/eie03.htm
[https://perma.cc/9UQA-ZA6W] (discussing the definition of districting in the context of
elections).
16. See 1960 World Series, supra note 9.
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Is there any good reason to tolerate districts, knowing that it can pro-
duce this discrepancy? Sure there is; one reason is to promote communi-
cation and connection between representatives and their constituents.17
But that’s not the only one. Another is to avoid the extreme results that
can be produced by at-large elections. If all seats in the legislature were
elected at large, it would be possible for a party to win just over 50% of
the votes statewide and capture every single seat in the legislature. If the
at-large elections were also conducted (as elections in the United States
generally are) under the first-past-the-post system, third-party candidates
could lower this percentage even more—in a close three-way race, a party
that won just over 33% of the votes statewide could capture every single
seat in the legislature.18
But presidential electors have no communication and scant connection
with those who elect them. Is there any good reason to conduct presiden-
tial elections on a districted basis, state by state, rather than on a national
basis? Yes. Conducting presidential elections on a state-by-state basis rec-
ognizes that states are sovereigns, “not mere political subdivisions of the
United States. State governments are neither regional offices nor admin-
istrative agencies of the Federal Government. The positions occupied by
state officials appear nowhere on the Federal Government’s most de-
tailed organizational chart.”19
States vary in many ways, including in the proportion of each state’s
population that is ineligible to vote—whether because of incarceration,
felony conviction, age, mental ability, or citizenship.20 Plus, maintaining
state control and avoiding centralized control over the election process is
a significant protection against tyranny.21
It bears emphasis that using states as districts for the purposes of presi-
dential elections does not mean that each state must be treated as a win-
ner-take-all bloc. Members of Congress are elected from particular states,
not at large across the United States or even from a region of states (such
as a federal judicial circuit).22 As a constitutional matter, members can be
(and have been) elected at large in a state.23 But they can also be elected
17. See KARL T. KURTZ, LEGISLATURES AND CITIZENS: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE LEGISLATURE 2 (1997), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/public/trust/
LegCitizens_PublicParticipation_Kurtz2.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM4S-FT6D] (noting that
communication between legislatures and their constituents provides “linkage” and legiti-
macy to the government).
18. See First Past the Post (FPTP), ACE PROJECT, http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/
es/esd/esd01/esd01a/default [https://perma.cc/5KXG-JDZF].
19. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
20. See Voter Registration Rules, VOTE.ORG, https://www.vote.org/voter-registration-
rules/ [https://perma.cc/W5HZ-VSKM] (listing voter registration rules by state).
21. See David Landau et al., Federalism for the Worst Case, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1187,
1247 (2020).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1–3.
23. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2019) (“For more than 50 years
after ratification of the Constitution, many States elected their congressional representa-
tives through at-large or ‘general ticket’ elections. Such States typically sent single-party
delegations to Congress. That meant that a party could garner nearly half of the vote state-
wide and wind up without any seats in the congressional delegation.” (citation omitted)).
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by district within a state, thereby opening up both the possibility of di-
vided congressional delegations from a state and the concomitant possi-
bility of a mismatch between the statewide congressional vote and the
allocation of that state’s congressional seats. Moreover, since 1842, Con-
gress has required, by statute, that members of the House be elected in
single-member districts.24 If it weren’t for this statute, states could elect
members of Congress at large (or in larger, equal-population, multiple-
member districts) and do so using a wide variety of election mechanisms,
including proportional representation.25
So, too, presidential electors may be selected by district rather than at
large.26 That’s what Maine and Nebraska currently do.27 And there is no
legal impediment to states using proportional representation to select
their presidential electors.28 What has driven all but two states to winner-
take-all elections for presidential electors is not legal compulsion. In-
stead, winner-take-all is the result of the desire of each state to maximize
its impact through bloc voting, coupled with the absence of a power in
Congress to compel district voting for presidential electors parallel to its
power to do so for congressional elections.29
24. See Joel Francis Paschal, The House of Representatives: “Grand Depository of the
Democratic Principle”?, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 276, 281 (1952); see also 2 U.S.C. § 2c
(2018) (current version, adopted in 1969). A small sliver of statutory authority for at-large
congressional elections appears to survive. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c)(5) (2018) (provision, en-
acted in 1941, stating that until a state is redistricted after a census, “if there is a decrease in
the number of Representatives and the number of districts in such State exceeds such de-
creased number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the State at large”); see also
Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (concluding that
adoption of § 2c did not impliedly repeal § 2a(c)(5)).
25. Although the Constitution does not require proportional representation, Rucho,
139 S. Ct. at 2501 (rejecting the constitutional requirement “that each party must be influ-
ential in proportion to its number of supporters”), nothing in the Constitution prohibits
proportional representation. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (“Even
more plainly, judicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to
allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within
quite tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 358 (2004)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This is not to say that single-member districts are preferable; it is
simply to say that single-member-district systems and more-directly-representational sys-
tems reflect different conclusions about the proper balance of different elements of a
workable democratic government.”).
To be clear, I am speaking of proportional representation as a voting mechanism so that
the proportions that matter are the proportions set by the distribution of votes in a given
election—not an a priori attempt to allocate seats to particular groups (racial or otherwise)
based on their proportion to the population. Cf. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
614 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that “a claim of insufficiently diverse broad-
casting viewpoints might be used to justify equally unconstrained racial preferences, linked
to nothing other than proportional representation of various races,” would “amount to the
core constitutional violation of ‘outright racial balancing’” (quoting Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989))).
26. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1892).
27. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2321 n.1 (2020) (“Maine and Nebraska . . .
developed a . . . system in which two electors go to the winner of the statewide vote and
one goes to the winner of each congressional district.”).
28. See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25.
29. Id. at 29 (“The district system was largely considered the most equitable, and
Madison wrote that it was that system which was contemplated by the framers of the Con-
stitution, although it was soon seen that its adoption by some States might place them at a
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C. INDIRECT ELECTIONS
Some may object that the analogy to legislatures ignores that while
there are multiple legislators in a legislature, there is only one President.
True enough, but while there is only one President, there are multiple
electors. This objection, then, is really an objection to indirect elections
rather than direct elections.
But what’s so bad about indirect elections? That’s how parliamentary
systems work: the people elect legislators, and the legislators elect a chief
executive.30 Unless one is ready to condemn parliamentary systems as
insufficiently democratic, indirect election of a chief executive should not
be condemned as undemocratic. Indeed, one might view presidential
nomination and Senate confirmation of principal officers, both executive
and judicial, as an indirect method of electing all of those officers.
If all states used the Maine–Nebraska system for selecting presidential
electors, our presidential election system would, in significant ways, look
like a parliamentary system.31 Voters in each congressional district would
choose representatives, and those representatives would choose the chief
executive. In choosing a representative, the voters would know which
party that representative will support for chief executive. Winning a ma-
jority of the legislature would mean winning the chief executive.
Of course, in a parliamentary system, the role of legislator and the role
of executive elector are combined together.32 Under the United States
Constitution, by contrast, these two roles are separated and held by dif-
ferent people.33 That reduces the dependency of the executive on the leg-
islature and enables voters to split their votes, supporting one party for
the legislature and a different party for the executive—thus increasing the
chances that the branches will check each other. But that increases the
options available to a voter, and it is hardly a basis for condemnation as
insufficiently democratic.
In addition, each state gets two presidential electors, corresponding to
disadvantage by a division of their strength . . . .”). Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1
(“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”), with id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“The Con-
gress may determine the Time of ch[oo]sing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall
give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.”). For further
discussion of congressional power regarding presidential elections, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 157 to 165.
30. See, e.g., Jonathan Zasloff, Why No Parliaments in the United States?, 35 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 269, 272 (2013) (“By ‘parliamentary democracy,’ I mean a governmental system in
which the electorate chooses the Legislature, which then in turn chooses the Executive.”).
31. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, WHY DO WE STILL HAVE THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 25
(2020) (“In its composition, the Electoral College was (and is) a temporary replica of Con-
gress populated by ‘electors’ . . . who would assemble only once . . . and who would have no
ongoing dealings with the national government. It was, in effect, a temporary
legislature . . . . ”).
32. See, e.g., Zasloff, supra note 30.
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (ensuring separation of roles by providing that “no
Senator or Representative . . . shall be appointed an Elector”).
454 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
the state’s senators.34 But because the electoral votes for each state
equals the sum of two senators plus the number of representatives each
state has in the House, the larger number of the latter generally (but not
always) swamps the former.35 California has about three-and-a-half times
as many people per presidential elector as Wyoming has.36 But California
has about sixty-six times as many people per senator as Wyoming has.37
Given the power of the Senate itself, both over legislation and over exec-
utive and judicial nominations, it is straining at gnats while swallowing
the camel to accept the Senate yet resist this modest nod to federalism
represented by the senatorial electors. If there were no downside risks in
a national popular vote, swatting this gnat might be worth it. But the risks
are too great.
III. CHANGED INCENTIVES UNDER THE NATIONAL
POPULAR VOTE COMPACT
The National Popular Vote Compact seeks to change the method of
presidential election to a national popular vote without amending the
Constitution.38 The basic idea is that each member state would cast its
electoral votes in accordance not with the vote in that state, but with the
national popular vote.39
The compact provides that each member state would conduct a state-
wide popular election, communicate the tally to other members, and add
all of those together (along with the number of votes in nonmember
states that hold a statewide popular election) to determine a national
popular vote total.40 Each member state, having determined a national
popular vote winner, would then appoint as the state’s electors those who
were “nominated in that state in association with the national popular
vote winner.”41 For example, if New Jersey voters supported the Demo-
cratic candidate, but the national popular vote was for the Republican
candidate, New Jersey would appoint the electors pledged to the Republi-
can candidate. Because the compact takes effect only when enacted by
states that cumulatively hold a majority of electoral votes, if all goes as
planned the result would be that the members’ electoral votes would con-
trol the outcome and guarantee that the popular vote winner is elected
34. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; THOMAS H. NEALE & ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43823, THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE (NPV) INITIATIVE: DIRECT ELECTION OF
THE PRESIDENT BY INTERSTATE COMPACT 1 (2019).
35. See id.
36. See Resident Population of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico:
2010 Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/
tables/2010/2010-apportionment/apport2010-table2.xls [https://perma.cc/YS27-RE6M].
37. See id.
38. NEALE & NOLAN, supra note 34, at 1.
39. Id. at 7.
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President.42
But all may not go as planned.
A. INCENTIVES TO EXPAND THE ELECTORATE
Under the current system, states have no incentive to increase the pro-
portion of its population eligible to vote. No matter how many people in
a state are eligible to vote, the state’s number of electors remains the
same. Each state gets two electors corresponding to its two senators.43
And each state gets an elector corresponding to each of its members of
the House of Representatives;44 those representatives, in turn, are “ap-
portioned among the several States according to their respective num-
bers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed.”45 So, too, states have no incentive to increase the
number of people who actually vote. No matter how many people in a
state actually vote in a presidential election, that state’s electoral votes
remain the same.
But if the national popular vote determines the winner of the presi-
dency, this changes. States then would have an incentive to broaden eligi-
bility to vote and to increase voter turnout.
There is a wide range of possible ways to increase eligibility to vote.
Ending felon disenfranchisement is one. Other possibilities include al-
lowing incarcerated prisoners to vote, allowing those under eighteen to
vote, and allowing aliens to vote.46 The voting age could be lowered mod-
estly to sixteen, dramatically to ten, or so low as to include those in utero.
Alien voting might be limited to those legally present in the United
States, or it might be expanded to those not legally present in the United
States or to those in detention because of their illegal presence. Naturally,
some would worry whether the votes of those in the custody of another
would have their votes dominated by their custodians—whether parents,
wardens, or immigration authorities.
If some of these seem radical, bear in mind that total population—not
voters—is the basis for allocating seats in the House of Representatives
(and therefore electors).47 States that have large portions of young peo-
ple, aliens, or prisoners would see their voters’ effective voting power
decreased by a move to national popular voting. Loss of current power
42. National Popular Vote, supra note 3.
43. NEALE & NOLAN, supra note 34, at 1.
44. Id. at 2.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
46. States have allowed aliens to vote. See, e.g., KEYSSAR, supra note 31 at 139–40
(discussing a Michigan “alien intent” law “which for decades had enfranchised (predomi-
nantly Democratic) immigrants who had been in the state for several years and declared
their intention to become citizens”). Cf. JESSE WEGMAN, LET THE PEOPLE PICK THE PRESI-
DENT 241 (2020) (asserting that “[i]n a popular vote election, . . . noncitizens would not
count at all”). A 1996 federal statute prohibits aliens from voting in federal elections, 18
U.S.C. § 611, but its constitutionality is questionable, particularly as applied to presidential
elections. See infra text accompanying notes 160–165.
47. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016).
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can be a powerful stimulus. Plus, changes that are anathema in some
states might be plausible in others.
Over time, still more radical ideas might be considered on the table
rather than off the wall. Options might include allowing part-year re-
sidents to vote, or even allowing corporations to vote.
Notice that eligibility to vote for the President need not be linked to
eligibility to vote for any other office. The Constitution requires that eli-
gibility for voting for Congress be tied to eligibility to vote for “the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”48 But there is no such re-
quirement for presidential electors, reflecting the basic point that the
Constitution does not require popular voting for the President.49 That
means that states could expand the franchise for presidential voting with-
out having to make a corresponding change with regard to voting for
other offices. Election officials are accustomed to dealing with voters who
can vote for only part of the ballot, and voting machines handle that all
the time; that’s what happens in party primaries where voters can vote in
one part of the ballot but not another.
States could also take steps to encourage people who are eligible to
vote to actually vote. For example, a state might make it very easy to
register to vote or make registration automatic based on a variety of trig-
gering events.50 Or a state might allow people to register at the moment
they show up at the polls to vote.51 States could insist on little to nothing
to prove eligibility to register or not require identification upon voting.52
They might expand early voting and voting by mail. To respond to the
risks posed by a possible resurgence of the coronavirus in the fall of 2020,
they might make voting by mail the norm by mailing ballots without
awaiting a request.53
Even more radically, they might require people to vote, backed by a
fine or even imprisonment. Or they might adopt cumulative voting—giv-
ing every voter (say) ten votes for President to allocate among candidates
as the voter sees fit—and then report the total vote using those cumula-
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (eligibility to vote for members of the House); see id.
amend. XVII (same requirement for eligibility to vote for members of Senate).
49. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892).
50. See, e.g., Automatic Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 14,
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-voter-registra-
tion.aspx [https://perma.cc/4K8Z-62FV] (providing an example of automated voter regis-
tration, primarily involving a state’s department of motor vehicles).
51. See, e.g., Same Day Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 28,
2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ZE48-FX4M] (discussing legislation allowing individuals to register and
vote all in the same day).
52. See, e.g., Wendy Underhill, Voter Identification Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (July 9, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/
voter-id.aspx [https://perma.cc/6G8S-8CYB] (discussing various state voter identification
requirements).
53. See Larry Buchanan et al., Will You Have Enough Time to Vote by Mail in Your
State?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/08/31/us/
politics/vote-by-mail-deadlines.html [https://perma.cc/BB5A-X874] (reporting that nine
states will send ballots to most voters automatically).
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tive numbers.54 The effect, of course, would be to multiply the power of
that state’s presidential vote.
B. INCENTIVES TO DEPRESS VOTING
Some may think that all but the most radical changes outlined above
would be good changes and that the most radical changes are so implausi-
ble as to not be cause for concern. On this view, the march of history is
toward broadening the franchise, and that march should be encouraged,
making the incentives created by the National Popular Vote Compact a
feature, not a bug. But not all incentives pull in the same direction. That
is because, if the national popular vote controls, then there is an incentive
to depress the votes of the in-state loser far beyond what it takes to win in
that state. Under the current method of presidential election, if a party is
confident of victory in a particular state, it doesn’t matter how many
votes the losing presidential candidate gets (so long as he or she in fact
loses). But under the National Popular Vote Compact, those votes for an
in-state loser might help that in-state loser win the national popular vote,
and thus the election.
All the ways to depress voting for one’s adversaries become more at-
tractive, starting with the most benign—making efforts to avoid encour-
aging voting by those likely to vote for one’s opponents. In some states,
there would be an incentive not only to continue (or expand) felon disen-
franchisement but also to purge the voter rolls aggressively and to make
registration difficult. On Election Day, techniques might include reducing
the number and accessibility of polling places, understaffing polling
places (thereby increasing wait times), checking identification insistently,
and spreading rumors about cops with arrest warrants working alongside
poll workers. Reducing the number of physical polling places and staffing
them with law enforcement or military personnel might be a reasonable
way to deal with a resurgence of the coronavirus, but it might also be an
attempt to depress voting.55 With preclearance no longer required,56 vari-
ous methods of voter suppression could be used, subject only to later liti-
gation, putting the burden of overcoming inertia back on the voter.57
C. RISKS GREATEST IN MOST HIGHLY PARTISAN STATES
Some might think that these incentives are present today in concen-
trated form in the presidential battleground states; after all, getting a few
more votes for one’s favored candidate, or suppressing a few that would
54. See Cumulative Voting, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
55. See, e.g., Joe Trovata, Wisconsin National Guard to Assist with Polling Station
Staffing, Other Missions, WIS. DEP’T MIL. AFFS. (Apr. 1, 2020), https://dma.wi.gov/DMA/
news/2020news/20041 [https://perma.cc/HN25-5QV8] (announcing that military personnel
will staff polling places for coronavirus purposes).
56. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
57. Cf. Danielle Lang & J. Gerald Hebert, A Post-Shelby Strategy: Exposing Discrimi-
natory Intent in Voting Rights Litigation, 127 YALE L.J.F. 779, 789–90 (2018).
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otherwise go to one’s disfavored candidate, can go a long way in a closely
divided state.
But the National Popular Vote Compact would extend these incentives
to all states, including the safest states. And if a state is dominated by a
single party on the state level, it would have not only the incentive but
also the opportunity to act on these incentives. Such a state can more
readily make changes to its election laws and practices, and it can more
readily avoid punishment for those changes at future elections.
Thus, the places where we might expect the biggest changes are safe
presidential states dominated on the state level by a single political
party—that is, the most highly partisan states in the Union.
And this is true whether or not the state has joined the Compact.
That’s because the member states agree to defer to the popular vote in all
the states that conduct a popular vote, not just to the popular vote in the
member states.58
D. FRAUD
Advocates of the National Popular Vote Compact contend that fraud is
less likely to be a concern under the Compact than it is under current
practice. They reason that it is harder to fraudulently manufacture (or
destroy) the many votes necessary to change a nationwide count than to
do the same and change the outcome in a single battleground state.59
That may be true if we focus only on fraud undertaken by outsiders,
including foreign agents hacking into election systems. If we focus on that
kind of fraud, we might assume that those in charge of state government
are eager to prevent and punish it. But if we focus on fraud by insiders, or
fraud that insiders are willing to avert their eyes from, the picture changes
dramatically.
Under the current system, there is no incentive for insiders to fraudu-
lently inflate or deflate the presidential vote in a safe state. It doesn’t
increase the state’s electoral vote.60 But insiders do have such an incen-
tive if the National Popular Vote Compact takes effect.61 Worse, the
Compact requires the member states to “treat as conclusive an official
statement containing the number of popular votes in a state for each
presidential slate.”62
58. Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, supra note 40, art. III, cl. 1.
59. KOZA ET AL., supra note 12, at 740–45.
60. NEALE & NOLAN, supra note 34, at 1.
61. Cf. Theodore H. White, Direct Elections: An Invitation to National Chaos, LIFE,
Jan. 30, 1970, at 4 (noting that if “all the raw votes from Hawaii to Maine are funneled into
one vast pool,” then “the pressure to cheat . . . must penetrate everywhere—for any vote
stolen anywhere in the Union pressures politicians thousands of miles away to balance . . .
it”).
62. Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, supra note 40, art. III, cl. 5. To
gain such conclusive effect, all that is required is that the official statement be “made by
the day established by federal law for making a state’s final determination conclusive as to
the counting of electoral votes by Congress.” Id. This is a reference to 3 U.S.C. § 5, which
creates a safe harbor for a final determination, pursuant to preexisting law, of any contro-
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And as with the other electoral changes discussed above, if a state is
dominated by a single party on the state level, those insiders would have
not only the incentive but also the opportunity to act on these incentives.
They are also more likely to avoid punishment for fraud, precisely be-
cause of one party’s dominance of the state. We might, therefore, expect
that the greatest risk of increased insider fraud would be safe presidential
states dominated by, on the state level, a single political party—that is,
the most highly partisan states in the Union. Again, given that member
states agree to defer to the popular vote in all the states that conduct a
popular vote,63 this is true in non-member states as well.
E. SUSPICION AND RUMORS
Some may think that good sense and good faith among the states
would prevent all but the most benign changes discussed above. That
might be enough in a less polarized environment, but it is not likely to be
enough today.
First, it is doubtful that all could agree on what changes are truly be-
nign. Moreover, most of the changes (perhaps all of them short of fraud)
could be supported by people who view themselves as acting in good
faith. I can picture some readers rolling their eyes and thinking, “No one
could in good faith support that change.” But even if all readers are
united in eye-rolling, they would disagree about which possible changes
merited that response. The very same change that some see as supporta-
ble in good faith, if not benign, would be viewed by other readers as be-
yond the pale.
Worse, in today’s polarized environment, with many people consuming
news sources that will tell them what they want to hear, even if good faith
leads states to avoid taking any of the actions discussed above, it is almost
certain that there would be suspicion and rumors that states did so.
Whether through cable news networks or social media, some will hear
and believe, for example, that one or more states allowed those not le-
gally in the country to vote. Others will hear and believe, for example,
that one or more states suppressed Black voting through a variety of
devices.
If a state dramatically decreases the number of physical polling places
and staffs them with law enforcement or military personnel, some will see
that as a wise way to safeguard the public health in a pandemic, and
others will see it as a bad-faith effort to depress the vote. Similarly, if a
state makes voting by mail very easy, some will see that as a wise re-
sponse to the coronavirus, and others will see it as an invitation to
versy or contest concerning the appointment of electors reached at least six days prior to
the time fixed for the meeting of electors. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2018) (providing rules to deal
with objections to “any vote or paper from a State”).
63. Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, supra note 40, art. III, cl. 1.
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fraud.64
F. MISCHIEF BEYOND A STATE’S ALLOCATED POWER
Such conduct—real, exaggerated, or imagined—will matter to people
wherever it occurred because it could determine the national popular
vote. Under today’s system, the impact on the election of any state’s mis-
chief in a presidential election is confined to the electoral vote in that
state—just as any state’s mischief in a Senate or House election is limited
to that state’s congressional delegation. No matter how badly New Jersey
behaves (or is thought to behave), it can provide no more than fourteen
electoral votes.65 No matter how badly Georgia behaves (or is thought to
behave), it can provide no more than sixteen electoral votes.66 In that
important sense, a state’s mischief is confined to that state.
But that limit is gone if the winner is determined by the national popu-
lar vote. Any state’s mischief in increasing the vote of its favored candi-
date, or decreasing the vote of its disfavored candidate, affects the total—
without the cap. And any state’s suspected mischief in increasing the vote
of its favored candidate, or decreasing the vote of its disfavored candi-
date, will raise suspicions about the total. For the first time ever in any
election for any federal office, a state’s mischief (or suspected mischief)
will have an impact (or be suspected of having an impact) beyond the
limits of that state’s power in the Union, measured by the number of
senators and representatives allocated to it in Congress.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBTS
The National Popular Vote Compact goes into effect only when
adopted by a sufficient number of states.67 It is not the unilateral act of
any state, but it goes into effect only “when states cumulatively possess-
ing a majority of the electoral votes have enacted” it.68 As a compact or
an agreement between the states, there is a serious constitutional ques-
tion whether it can take effect without the consent of Congress. Even if
congressional consent is not required, there is some reason to question
whether the compact is judicially enforceable.
A. COMPACT CLAUSE
The Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent
of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
64. See Emily Bazelon, Will Americans Lose Their Right to Vote in the Pandemic?,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/magazine/voting-by-
mail-2020-covid.html [https://perma.cc/TX4A-XAY3] (quoting Wisconsin Senate majority
leader who described the governor’s proposal to send mail-in ballots to every registered
voter a “complete fantasy”).
65. Distribution of Electoral Votes, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/elector
al-college/allocation [https://perma.cc/U45T-P5EX].
66. Id.
67. See National Popular Vote, supra note 3.
68. Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, supra note 40, art. IV, cl. 1.
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State.”69 On its face, this would seem to clearly prohibit all agreements or
compacts between states, absent congressional consent. But this prohibi-
tion has long been read more narrowly.70
The kinds of agreements or compacts that require congressional con-
sent are those “which may tend to increase and build up the political
influence of the contracting States, so as to encroach upon or impair the
supremacy of the United States or interfere with their rightful manage-
ment of particular subjects placed under their entire control.”71 For ex-
ample, if an agreement establishing the boundary between states “cut[s]
off an important and valuable portion of a State, the political power of
the State enlarged would be affected by the settlement of the boundary;”
accordingly, “the consent of Congress may well be required.”72 By con-
trast, if the states are “not . . . adjusting the boundary between them . . .
[but merely] locating precisely [the] already existing boundary,” then
“neither State can be viewed as enhancing its power in any sense that
threatens the supremacy of the Federal Government,” and congressional
consent is not required.73
Advocates of the National Popular Vote Compact contend that there is
no need for congressional consent because the choice of the manner of
appointing electors is exclusively a state power and therefore does not
encroach upon federal supremacy.74 There are nonetheless substantial
reasons to think that the National Popular Vote Compact is subject to the
requirement of congressional consent because that requirement not only
guards against threats to federal supremacy, narrowly conceived, but also,
as the Court put it in 1838, “guard[s] against the derangement of” the
agreeing states’ “federal relations with the other states of the Union.”75
69. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3.
70. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517–19 (1893).
71. Id. at 518; see also id. at 519 (“Looking at the clause in which the terms ‘compact’
or ‘agreement’ appear, it is evident that the prohibition is directed to the formation of any
combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”).
72. Id. at 520. For a list of numerous boundary agreements to which Congress con-
sented, see Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitu-
tion—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 735–48 (1925).
73. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 370 (1976); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1978) (holding that Multistate Tax Compact
did not require congressional consent because it “contains no provisions that would en-
hance the political power of the member States in a way that encroaches upon the
supremacy of the United States,” while acknowledging that “[t]here well may be some
incremental increase in the bargaining power of the member States [with respect to] the
corporations subject to their respective taxing jurisdictions”).
74. KOZA ET AL., supra note 12, at 633.
75. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 726 (1838) (stating that power of Con-
gress to refuse assent to compact would be “a perfect nullity for all practical purposes” if it
did not extend to compacts of boundary and explaining that the power is not designed to
“prevent the states from settling their own boundaries, so far as merely affected their rela-
tions to each other, but to guard against the derangement of their federal relations with the
other states of the Union, and the federal government; which might be injuriously affected,
if the contracting states might act upon their boundaries at their pleasure”); see also U.S.
Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 471 (“The relevant inquiry must be one of impact on our federal
structure.”). In holding that the Multistate Tax Compact did not require congressional con-
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Imagine if Ohio and Pennsylvania entered into a compact to award
their electoral votes as a bloc to the winner of the combined popular vote
in those two states. That would almost certainly tend to increase and
build up the political influence of those states; after all, the reason why
nearly all individual states opted for winner-take-all electoral schemes in
the first place was precisely to increase their political power vis-à-vis
other states, and the reason so few states have opted to allocate electors
by congressional district is that it decreases their political power vis-à-vis
other states. Such a compact between Ohio and Pennsylvania would ef-
fectively create, for presidential election purposes, a jumbo-state with a
winner-take-all system.76
If that’s true for a compact between two states, it’s all the more true for
a compact between more than two states. Imagine a similar compact to
pool the electoral vote in favor of the popular-vote winner in all member
states, but that would go into effect only upon the agreement of states
that collectively have a majority of the electoral vote. That would effec-
tively create, for presidential election purposes, a mega-state that con-
trolled the outcome of the presidential election. No other states would
matter. Once it took effect, the pressure on other states to join would be
irresistible. (An even more coercive version can be imagined: If the com-
pact closed membership as soon as the members collectively had a major-
ity of the electoral vote, there would be enormous pressure to be quick
enough to join before the door closed.)
These examples should be sufficient to demonstrate that a tendency to
increase and build up the political influence of the contracting states in a
way that “derange[s] . . . their federal relations with the other states of the
Union” is sufficient to require congressional consent.77 Indeed, the exam-
ple given by the Court in Virginia v. Tennessee of a boundary agreement
that moved “an important and valuable portion of a State” from one state
to another, thereby enhancing the political power of the enlarged state,
suggests as much.78 As Felix Frankfurter and James Landis put it,
“[A]greements may affect the interests of States other than those parties
to the agreement: the national, and not merely a regional, interest may be
involved. Therefore, Congress must exercise national supervision through
its power to grant or withhold consent, or to grant it under appropriate
conditions.”79
sent, the Supreme Court did not hold that the threat to nonmember states or the federal
structure is irrelevant but that the plaintiff failed to show such a threat. Id. at 477–78.
76. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“[N]or [may] any State be formed by the Junc-
tion of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of
the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”).
77. Rhode Island, 37 U.S. at 726; see Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and the
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, 6 ELECTION L.J. 372, 393 (2007) (arguing that
the Compact Clause “protects the interests of non-compacting states from the political
encroachments of compacting states, and that the [National Popular Vote] Interstate Com-
pact is this type of political encroachment”).
78. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893).
79. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 72, at 695. If more convincing is needed: Imagine
that Maryland (with its 6 million people earning an $80,000 median household income) and
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One might go even further and argue that such an agreement would
properly be considered an “alliance” or a “confederation,” which the
Constitution flatly forbids states from entering into.80 Justice Story de-
scribed these forbidden agreements as including those where “the parties
are leagued for . . . political co-operation . . . or external political depen-
dence.”81 Because such agreements make a state’s exercise of a political
power—selecting its presidential electors—dependent on a political en-
tity outside itself, they may be constitutionally forbidden. Imagine if a
state entered into an agreement with a foreign government regarding the
selection of a state’s presidential elector. One would hope that this would
count as a forbidden alliance or confederation. But there is no separate
constitutional language barring alliances and confederations between
states and foreign government; instead, by barring a state from entering
into any alliance or confederation, the constitutional prohibition applies
whether the other party is a foreign nation or a sister state. As Chief
Justice Marshall explained,
A state is forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance or confedera-
tion. If these compacts are with foreign nations, they interfere with
the treaty making power which is conferred entirely on the general
government; if with each other, for political purposes, they can
scarcely fail to interfere with the general purpose and intent of the
[C]onstitution.82
It may be impossible to draw a neat analytic line between a forbidden
confederation and a permissible compact subject to congressional con-
sent. Frankfurter and Landis maintained that this is not a line that can be
drawn by courts and that “only Congress is the appropriate organ for
West Virginia (with its 1.8 million people earning a $43,000 median household income)
agreed that Maryland would pay West Virginia $600 million in exchange for West Virginia
agreeing to appoint one of its presidential electors in accordance with the popular vote in
Maryland. See Grant Suneson, Wealth in America: Where Are the Richest and Poorest
States Based on Household Income?, USA TODAY (Oct. 8, 2018, 11:09 AM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/money/economy/2018/10/08/wealth-america-household-income-
richest-poorest-states/38051359/ [https://perma.cc/K2UY-LBUJ]. Or suppose one state
agreed to cede a portion of its territory to another state but only on the condition that the
popular vote in the ceding state control the appointment of one presidential elector in the
receiving state. If all that matters for purposes of congressional consent is that there is no
risk to the supremacy of federal law, narrowly conceived, these agreements could go into
effect without congressional consent.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation . . . .”).
81. 3 JOSEPH L. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1397 (1833).
82. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249 (1833). Although Marshall
referred to “treaty, alliance or confederation” as “these compacts,” it is clear that he is not
referring to the Compact Clause both from the language itself and because his next two
sentences discuss letters of marque and reprisal and the coining of money—the two flat
prohibitions that immediately follow the bar on treaties, alliances, and confederations in
Article I, Section Ten, Clause One. Id.; cf. James F. Blumstein & Thomas J. Cheeseman,
State Empowerment and the Compact Clause, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 775, 786–87
(2019) (noting that the Supreme Court has been more willing to find some compacts or
agreements among the states as not requiring congressional consent than to do so for com-
pacts or agreements with foreign powers (citing Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540 (1840))).
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determining what arrangements between States might fall within the pro-
hibited class of ‘Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation’, and what arrange-
ments come within the permissive class of ‘Agreement or Compact.’”83
It must be admitted that there is an important difference between these
various examples and the National Popular Vote Compact. The National
Popular Vote Compact does not look only to the popular vote of the
member states but also to the popular vote in non-member states.84 It
does not broadly attempt to freeze out the power of non-member states.
Perhaps this is enough to save it from both outright condemnation and
the need for congressional consent.85 But that is far from clear. First,
there is one circumstance in which non-member states would be frozen
out. That will happen to any state that chooses its electors by a method
other than popular vote for each presidential slate. Every state currently
does conduct such a popular vote, and member states agree to do so.86
But if a non-member state decided to select its presidential electors by
83. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 72, at 694–95, 695 n.37 (stating that any analyti-
cal classification “is bound to go shipwreck for we are in a field in which political judgment
is, to say the least, one of the important factors” and that the “considerations that led the
Supreme Court to leave Congress the determination of what constitutes a republican form
of government as guaranteed by the Constitution are equally controlling in leaving to Con-
gress to circumscribe the area of agreement open to the States” (citation omitted)). Derek
Muller has argued that the Supreme Court has effectively read the prohibition on states
entering into treaties with other states out of the Constitution. See Muller, supra note 77, at
383 (arguing that the Court “allowed any kind of agreement between [the] states” and
thereby “undercut the total prohibition on any ‘treaty, alliance, or confederation’”). He
relies on a passage from Virginia v. Tennessee in which the Court stated that “[t]he terms
‘agreement’ or ‘compact,’ taken by themselves, are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace
all forms of stipulation, written or verbal, and relating to all kinds of subjects.” Virginia,
148 U.S. at 517–18; see Muller, supra note 77, at 383. But the Court in Virginia v. Tennessee
was plainly discussing the Compact Clause, not the Treaty Clause, since it quoted the terms
“agreement” and “compact” in the cited sentence and the full Compact Clause in the prior
paragraph. See Virginia, 148 U.S. at 517. Muller seems to think that simply because the
Court has indicated that some political agreements are permissible (with congressional
consent), no agreement between the states can run afoul of the Treaty Clause. But that
does not follow. Some kinds of political agreements might be prohibited treaties, even if
some political agreements are permissible (with congressional consent). Simply because
“[t]he terms ‘agreement’ [and] ‘compact’ taken by themselves . . . embrace all forms of
stipulation . . . relating to all kinds of subjects,” see id. at 517–18 (emphasis added), it does
not follow that they might not have a narrower meaning when contrasted with the terms
“treaty,” “alliance,” and “confederation.” Alternatively, a “treaty,” “alliance,” or “confed-
eration” might be viewed as a subset of “agreement” or “compact.” It may be so difficult to
draw the distinction between a “treaty,” “alliance,” or “confederation” (on the one hand)
and an “agreement” or “compact” (on the other) that there are no judicially manageable
standards and, as Frankfurter and Landis suggested, the distinction poses a nonjusticiable
political question. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 72, at 695 n.37. If so, Muller might
be right that Article III courts cannot police that boundary. But this conclusion simply
underscores the responsibility of the House and the Senate to do so.
84. Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, supra note 40, art. III, cl. 1.
85. Cf. Amar, supra note 10, at 478 (arguing that congressional consent would not be
needed but stating that “[t]he matter might be different if the coordinating states had
sought to freeze other states out—say, by agreeing to back the candidate winning the most
total votes within the coordinating states as a collective bloc, as opposed to the most total
votes nationwide”).
86. Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, supra note 40, art. II (“Each mem-
ber state shall conduct a statewide popular election for President and Vice President of the
United States.”).
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some other means, the member states would control the outcome and
that non-member state would be irrelevant. That’s not as dramatic a
freeze-out of non-members states as a compact that counted only the
votes in member states, but it does freeze out any state that rejects the
popular vote premise of the compact.
But even apart from the possibility of freezing out any state that
chooses not to conduct a popular vote, there is still a “derangement” of
the federal relations among the states of the Union. The Constitution al-
locates to each state a certain share in the selection of those who exercise
the power of the national government. Each state is allocated two sena-
tors.87 Each state is allocated representatives in the House in proportion
to its population.88 Each state is allocated presidential electors equal to
the sum of senators and representatives.89 And no state has any agency in
the exercise of any other state’s allocated power.
The National Popular Vote Compact would change—derange—that as-
pect of the federal relations among the states of the Union. It would give
every state that conducts a popular presidential vote a role in the selec-
tion of the electors of every other state that joined the compact. That
effect is not incidental to some other purpose—that is the very purpose of
the compact.90 Thus, while the matter is not free from doubt, there is a
substantial argument that the compact is unconstitutional, at least absent
congressional consent.
B. ROLE OF ELECTORS
This past term, in Chiafalo v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that
a state has the power to require a presidential elector to vote in accor-
dance with that state’s popular vote.91 The Court observed that states had
long required electors to pledge in advance to support the nominee of the
political party whose candidate wins that state’s popular vote, and that it
had “upheld such a pledge requirement decades ago, rejecting the argu-
ment that the Constitution ‘demands absolute freedom for the elector to
vote his own choice.’”92 It concluded that a state may not only require
such a pledge but “may also penalize an elector for breaking his pledge
and voting for someone other than the presidential candidate who won
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
88. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
89. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
90. Could an interstate compact (with or without congressional consent) create a sin-
gle deliberative Electoral College—despite the constitutional requirement that “Electors
shall meet in their respective States” rather than in a central location—by providing for a
video conference among all electors across the country? U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; id.
amend. XII. Although the term “Electoral College” is commonly used to refer to all elec-
tors, it would be more precise to refer to “Electoral Colleges” because each state has its
own college of electors. See 3 U.S.C. § 4 (2018) (“Each state may, by law, provide for the
filling of any vacancies which may occur in its college of electors when such college meets
to give its electoral vote.”).
91. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020).
92. Id. at 2319–20 (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228 (1952)).
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his State’s popular vote.”93 In a companion case where the state had re-
placed, rather than penalized, the elector, the Court “reversed for the
reasons stated in Chiafalo.”94 Thus, it is clear that a state may require its
electors to vote in accordance with that state’s popular vote.
The Court offered two basic reasons for this conclusion: text and long-
settled practice. As a matter of text, the Court stated that “the power to
appoint an elector . . . includes power to condition his appointment—that
is, to say what the elector must do for the appointment to take effect.”95
Just as a state can require that an elector live in the state and “can insist
. . . that the elector pledge to cast his Electoral College ballot for his
party’s presidential nominee, thus tracking the State’s popular vote,” so
too, “so long as nothing else in the Constitution poses an obstacle[,] a
State can add . . . an associated condition of appointment: It can demand
that the elector actually live up to his pledge, on pain of penalty.”96
It rejected the elector’s textual argument that “electors” who “vote” by
“ballot” must be able to vote as they choose.97 The Court gave several
examples where voting does not “connote independent choice,” including
“a person [who] always votes in the way his spouse, or pastor, or union
tells him to.”98Although some Framers expected presidential electors to
exercise their own judgment, they “did not reduce their thoughts about
electors’ discretion to the printed page,” and the text “took no position
on how independent from—or how faithful to—party and popular prefer-
ences the electors’ votes should be.”99 This textual argument supports a
broad power of a state legislature to direct how a state’s electoral votes
will be cast and will cheer advocates of the National Popular Vote
Compact.
But the Court also relied on a long-established practice. Going back to
the nation’s first contested presidential election in 1796, “[w]ould-be elec-
tors declared themselves for one or the other party’s presidential candi-
date” so that “selectors of an elector knew just what they were getting—
not someone who would deliberate in good Hamiltonian fashion, but
someone who would vote for their party’s candidate.”100 The Twelfth
Amendment, by providing for a separate vote for President and Vice
President, enabled electors to “‘carry out the desires of the people’ who
had sent him to the Electoral College.”101 By 1892, the Court could say
that, in practice, electors “were chosen ‘simply to register the will of the
appointing power in respect of a particular candidate.’”102
93. Id. at 2320.
94. Colorado Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2316 (2020) (per curiam).
95. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2325 (referencing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; id. amend. XII).
98. Id. (“We might question his judgment, but we would have no problem saying that
he ‘votes’ or fills in a ‘ballot.’”).
99. Id. at 2326.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2327 (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224 n.11 (1952)).
102. Id. (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 (1892)).
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State election laws evolved to reinforce that development, ensuring
that a State’s electors would vote the same way as its citizens. . . .
States began in the early 1900s to enact statutes requiring electors to
pledge that they would squelch any urge to break ranks with voters.
Washington’s law, penalizing a pledge’s breach, is only another in the
same vein. It reflects a tradition more than two centuries old. In that
practice, electors are not free agents; they are to vote for the candi-
date whom the State’s voters have chosen.103
It acknowledged that 180 “faithless” votes had been cast and that Con-
gress had counted these votes but emphasized that these votes (putting
aside the ones from 1872 when the Democratic nominee died just after
Election Day) “represent just one-half of one percent of the total,” and
“because faithless votes have never come close to affecting an outcome,
only one has ever been challenged.”104 While that one challenged vote
was counted, “the Electors cannot rest a claim of historical tradition on
one counted vote in over 200 years.”105
There is, of course, no established practice of choosing electors who are
legally obligated to vote for a candidate whom the state’s voters have
rejected. And no established practice of choosing electors who are legally
obligated to vote for a candidate that some set of people outside the state
have chosen.106
It may be that the absence of such a tradition leaves the power in the
state legislature—subject to other constitutional constraints, including the
Compact Clause.107 One such constraint is the Guarantee Clause.108
Some might contend the National Popular Vote Compact violates the
Guarantee Clause, reasoning that a state that hands over its vote to the
citizens of another sovereign is no longer republican.109 Imagine if a state
decided to appoint electors who were legally obligated to vote for the
candidate chosen by the King of France—or the President of Russia.
103. Id. at 2328 (citation omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. To be clear, the concern is not that the National Popular Vote Compact would
require electors who were pledged to the candidate who won in their state to instead vote
for a competing candidate if that competing candidate won the national popular vote. That
is not how the compact is designed to work. Under the compact, the electors pledged to the
candidate who won the national popular vote would be appointed as a member state’s
electors regardless of who won the popular vote in that state. For example, if the Demo-
cratic candidate won in New Jersey, but the Republican candidate won the national popu-
lar vote, New Jersey would appoint as its electors those who were pledged to vote for the
Republican candidate. The switch from the state’s own vote to the national vote occurs at
the elector selection stage—not at the elector voting stage.
107. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324 n.4 (“Checks on a State’s power to appoint elec-
tors, or to impose conditions on an appointment, can theoretically come from anywhere in
the Constitution. A State, for example, cannot select its electors in a way that violates the
Equal Protection Clause. And if a State adopts a condition on its appointments that effec-
tively imposes new requirements on presidential candidates, the condition may conflict
with the Presidential Qualifications Clause.”).
108. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
109. See id.
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Chiafalo held that “[t]he Constitution’s text and the Nation’s history
both support allowing a State to enforce an elector’s pledge to support his
party’s nominee—and the state voters’ choice—for President.”110 And
the Court made a point of not speaking to other situations. In particular,
it noted “that because the situation is not before us, nothing in this opin-
ion should be taken to permit the States to bind electors to a deceased
candidate.”111 Thus, while the Chiafalo decision is certainly more
favorable to the National Popular Vote Compact than a contrary holding
would have been,112 one might reasonably conclude that because the situ-
ation was not before the Court, nothing in the opinion should be taken to
permit the states to choose electors who are bound to support the candi-
date chosen by some set of people outside the state.
And even if a state can choose to select its own electors in this way, it
does not follow that one state can enforce an agreement with another
state to do so. Even if the power to appoint implies the power to impose
conditions on the appointment, it does not follow that the power to ap-
point implies the power to enter into legally binding contracts about the
exercise of that power.113
That’s because even where the ordinary requirements of a contract are
all present, a contract concerning how one will vote or make a political
appointment is not legally enforceable. A presidential candidate might
promise to appoint someone to the Supreme Court in exchange for (say)
withdrawing from the presidential race, but such a contract would not be
legally enforceable.114 A state can enter into a legally enforceable con-
110. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323–24.
111. Id. at 2328 n.8.
112. If the Court had held that an elector must be free to cast an independent vote,
while distinguishing Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952), as involving an unenforceable politi-
cal pledge, that would have lent support to the argument that even if a state may make a
political pledge about how it will select its presidential electors, such a pledge is not legally
binding.
113. Lots of political pledges are not legally binding. For example, George H.W. Bush
famously promised: “Read my lips: no new taxes.” Vice President George H.W. Bush,
Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention (Aug. 18, 1988), https://miller
center.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/august-18-1988-acceptance-speech-republi
can-national [https://perma.cc/59DX-WPBP]; see Stephen D. Sencer, Read My Lips: Exam-
ining the Legal Implications of Knowingly False Campaign Promises, 90 MICH. L. REV. 428,
469 (1991) (arguing that the law “should demand” “truth and honesty” “in the world of
politics,” while acknowledging the “legal system’s historical reluctance or inability to play a
role in policing . . . campaign deception”). Using the language of contract does not change
that, as the “Contract with America” illustrates. Hurt v. Wicker, No. 1:06-cv-241-M-D,
2006 WL 2727980, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2006) (dismissing complaint alleging breach
of the “Contract with America”). See generally CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD
PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO
CHANGE THE NATION 4–5, 8 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
114. See United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that
“[s]ome historians say that . . . Earl Warren came to be Chief Justice of the United States”
by “deliver[ing] the California delegation at the 1952 Republican convention to Eisen-
hower (rather than Senator Taft) in exchange for a commitment to appoint him to the next
vacancy on the Supreme Court”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 599 (2018) (“Whoever, being a can-
didate, directly or indirectly promises or pledges the appointment . . . of any person to any
public or private position or employment, for the purpose of procuring support in his can-
didacy shall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 600 (2018) (“Who-
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tract with another state to buy (say) office equipment. But could a state
enter into a legally enforceable contract with another state to buy its elec-
toral votes? Could members of Congress from two states enter into a
legally enforceable contract with each other to vote as a single bloc?
V. IMAGINING ELECTIONS UNDER THE NATIONAL
POPULAR VOTE COMPACT
If the requisite number of states joined the National Popular Vote
Compact, the incentives discussed above would kick in. States would
have an incentive to increase the number of voters for favored candidates
and to decrease the number of voters for disfavored candidates. In our
current political culture, many would believe that states were engaged in
such activities, even if they weren’t.115
A. REACTION
How will states react when they learn (or wrongly believe) that other
states are taking steps to increase the number of voters for favored candi-
dates and to decrease the number of voters for disfavored candidates?
For example, how will other states react to the news (or rumors) that
California is letting people vote who are in the country illegally? How
ever, directly or indirectly, promises any employment, position, compensation, contract,
appointment, or other benefit, provided for or made possible in whole or in part by any
Act of Congress, or any special consideration in obtaining any such benefit, to any person
as consideration, favor, or reward for any political activity or for the support of or opposi-
tion to any candidate or any political party in connection with any general or special elec-
tion to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political
convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”); Blagojevich, 794 F.3d at 737
(declining to address whether § 599 is compatible with the First Amendment).
115. See, e.g., Nick Corasaniti, A Pennsylvania County’s Election Day Nightmare Un-
derscores Voting Machine Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/30/us/politics/pennsylvania-voting-machines.html [https://perma.cc/H4PJ-EZMD]
(referring to “an era where some candidates and incumbents try to challenge or discredit a
close loss by questioning the system, either with unfounded allegations of voter fraud or
claims of a ‘rigged’ election,” and stating, “Voters across the county said the experience
further eroded their already shaken confidence in the election process”); see also, e.g.,
Michael D. Shear, Trump Again Assails Mail-In Voting, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2020), https:/
/www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/us/politics/trump-mail-in-voting.html [https://perma.cc/
X683-RRUU] (“The president has been raging against voting by mail for several months,
claiming without evidence that the process is plagued by fraud.”); Bazelon, supra note 64
(quoting President Trump calling voting by mail “corrupt” and Representative Thomas
Massie calling it “the end of our republic as we know it”); Maggie Haberman et al.,
Trump’s False Attacks on Voting by Mail Stir Broad Concern, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/us/politics/trump-vote-by-mail.html [https://perma.cc/
W4V3-MKAW] (stating that “Mr. Trump has focused intensive new attacks on voting by
mail,” and that President Trump claimed that “‘[t]here is tremendous evidence of fraud
whenever you have mail-in ballots,’ . . . a statement that has no basis in the experience of
the states that give voters the option of voting by mail”); id. (noting that Professor Richard
L. Hasen “said that unlike the president’s false claims about in-person voting, there have
been sporadic problems with mail-in voting, giving Mr. Trump a kernel of truth on which to
build an indictment of the entire system”).
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will other states react to the news (or rumors) that Texas is restricting the
hours and locations of voting in an effort to suppress the Black vote?
One reaction would be to change their own voting practices to counter-
balance what other states are (or thought to be) doing. If California is
letting people who are in the country illegally vote, we better lower our
voting age. If Texas is restricting the hours and locations of voting in an
effort to suppress the Black vote, we better expand early voting and let
prisoners vote. Suspicions about what is going on in other states could
lead states to change their practices, which could, in turn, lead other
states to change their practices so that a real change on the ground could
be brought about by rumors. Indeed, fear that a state might take some
action could prompt preemptive action by other states so that a real
change on the ground could be brought about by fear.
It is possible that these moves and countermoves might prompt a state
to withdraw from the compact. The compact permits withdrawal, but a
withdrawal after July 20 of a presidential election year does not take ef-
fect until the next election.116 One way in which the constitutional issues
discussed above might be litigated would be if one or more states pur-
ported, after July 20, to withdraw effective immediately and other mem-
ber states sued to compel compliance with the compact. There would
then be about three-and-a-half months until Election Day for the litiga-
tion to be resolved.
On the other hand, if no state withdrew before Election Day, but in the
weeks following a presidential election a compact state concluded (rightly
or wrongly) that some other state improperly (in the view of the first
state) inflated or deflated its vote, it might respond in other ways. Fraud
is perhaps the easiest example of real or imagined state misbehavior that
could prompt a response by other states. (Other actions, such as voting by
those not legally in the country or vote suppression, could similarly pro-
voke a response.) If a compact state is convinced that there was rampant
fraud in another state, its executive might refuse to count that other
state’s vote in compiling the national popular vote. This would mean that
the “national popular vote” as calculated in the refusing member state
would be different than the “national popular vote” calculated in other
member states—unless all member states reached the same conclusion,
but there is no mechanism for such coordination.
Instead, any such refusal would appear to violate the compact, which
makes an official statement of the popular votes “conclusive.”117 But if
litigation were brought to enforce the compact, all kinds of questions
would arise.
116. See Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, supra note 40, art. IV, cl. 2.
117. Id. art. III, cl. 5.
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B. LITIGATION
One set of questions would be the constitutional questions discussed
above. The point of that discussion was not to reach a conclusion about
those questions but rather to demonstrate that they are serious ques-
tions—serious enough that a state might act on them.
In addition to the issues of whether the compact is constitutionally per-
missible and enforceable, there would be issues about who could sue to
enforce it. Only a member state? A non-member state whose votes were
rejected? The rejected electors? A presidential candidate? Are all mem-
ber states necessary parties to the litigation? All non-member states? All
presidential candidates?
There would also be the question of whether the compact should be
interpreted, on the merits, to treat a count tainted by fraud as “conclu-
sive.” If both the rejected and rejecting state were members, the rejecting
state might claim that the rejected state violated its obligation to “make a
final determination of the number of popular votes cast in the state,”
freeing the rejecting state from its obligations under the compact.118
Nor could a state avoid litigation simply by adhering to the terms of the
compact. That’s because the candidate who won the popular vote in that
state but whose electors were not appointed could sue, raising the same
constitutional and interpretive issues.119
Litigation is possible, then, with regard to the appointment of electors
in every member state where there is a mismatch between that state’s
own popular vote and the national popular vote. Depending on the par-
ties named in each case, litigation might be brought in state court, federal
district court, or even the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. And de-
pending on where the litigation is brought, consolidation may—or may
not—be available.
The time to resolve all this litigation before the electors meet in their
respective states to vote will certainly be less than six weeks, and it may
well be less than one week. That’s because Election Day is the Tuesday
after the first Monday in November (which can range from November 2
to November 8),120 and the date for electors to cast their votes is the
Monday after the second Wednesday in December (which can range from
December 13 to December 19).121 That’s forty-two days from Election
Day until the electors must meet and vote, counting Election Day and the
day the electors meet. The very earliest that a member state could ap-
point electors—and thereby trigger litigation by those aggrieved by the
appointment—would be forty-two days before the electors vote.
However, members of the National Popular Vote Compact may not be
able to appoint electors that quickly, even if state law otherwise permit-
118. Id. art. III, cl. 4.
119. Indeed, that candidate could sue, raising the constitutional issues, even if there
were no claims or rumors of other misconduct in the election.
120. 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
121. Id. § 7.
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ted such speed. Under the compact, members must make a final determi-
nation of their own popular vote at least six days before the meeting of
the electors.122 That is the same date as the safe harbor for a final deter-
mination of any controversy or contest under preexisting law concerning
the appointment of electors under the Electoral Count Act,123 and the
same date set by the compact for member states to give “conclusive” ef-
fect to official statements of popular votes for all states.124 So a state that
was eager to get inside the safe harbor might announce a decision to re-
ject another state’s popular vote as soon as possible to maximize how
much of the possible thirty-five days between Election Day and the safe
harbor would be available. But the state might not be able to tally the
national popular vote and appoint its electors until the safe harbor day
arrives. All member states have to wait for the slowest state.125 If there
are unresolved disputes about the counting of votes in even one state, the
compact requires all member states to wait until either that dispute is
resolved or there are only six days until the day for electors to vote
before they tally the national public vote and appoint their electors. If
one state fails to make it into the safe harbor, it appears that every mem-
ber state would also fail because they would have to wait until the time
expired. And if one state gets in just under the wire, every member state
may fail unless they can turn things around in the minutes or hours left.
So we may be looking at six days to resolve these legal issues about the
constitutionality, enforceability, and proper interpretation of the com-
pact—with litigation beginning after the safe harbor has already closed.
Maybe even less. While the safe harbor provides an incentive to resolve
disputes prior to that date, it does not so require. Nor does the National
Popular Vote Compact, which requires each member state to tally the
national popular vote total “[p]rior to the time set by law for the meeting
and voting by the presidential electors” and to appoint the corresponding
electors.126 A state that was not so concerned about the safe harbor might
wait longer—perhaps simply to delay, perhaps to consider its options
carefully, perhaps to see what happens in the state it suspects of improper
behavior, perhaps to see how other states are reacting—to announce its
tally of the national popular vote and appoint the corresponding electors,
122. Members must also communicate their statement to other member states within
twenty-four hours. Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, supra note 40, art. III,
cl. 4.
123. 3 U.S.C. § 5.
124. See Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, supra note 40, art. III, cl. 5.
125. Increased voting by mail due to the coronavirus could easily delay the counting of
votes. Shane Goldmacher, A Winner on Election Day in November? Don’t Count on It,
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/us/politics/november-
2020-election-day-results.html [https://perma.cc/R9CK-SR78] (noting that “a senior adviser
on election security for the Department of Homeland Security[ ] said the greater number
of mail-in ballots this fall would make results take longer to tabulate than in the past,” and
that “‘[t]he need to take a longer time to process and count these ballots is a sign of the
process working,’ . . . [not] ‘an indication of anything malicious’”).
126. Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill, supra note 40, art. III, cl. 1.
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or to announce its rejection of the compact and appoint the electors cor-
responding to the winner in that state.
C. LEGISLATIVE APPOINTMENT AND MULTIPLE SLATES OF ELECTORS
All of this might lead state legislatures to get into the act and appoint
electors themselves. They might foresee that disputes might not be re-
solved in time for the electors to vote and that this might be viewed as the
state having “failed to make a choice” on Election Day—triggering the
existing statutory provision for state legislatures to appoint electors after
Election Day.127 They might also foresee that if litigation ultimately re-
jected the state executive’s position about the compact, then a backup
appointment of electors might be necessary to avoid the state having no
electors counted in the presidential elections. In addition to litigation un-
certainty, state legislatures may also appoint electors themselves because
they foresee the possibility that issues about the constitutionality, en-
forceability, and interpretation of the compact will arise when the House
and Senate meet for the counting of the electoral vote. At that meeting,
resolution of those issues might result in the rejection of a state’s electo-
ral vote.
If the state executive and legislature are in accord, the electors directly
appointed by the legislature might be the same as those certified by the
executive. In that instance, one simply serves as a backup to the other.
But if the state executive and the state legislature disagree about the con-
stitutionality, enforceability, or interpretation of the compact, or about
the facts of what actually happened in other states—as is likely if the
executive and the legislature are in the hands of different parties—there
could be two opposing slates of electors.128
The result (particularly if there has been no final resolution before the
safe harbor closes) is that competing slates of electors might meet and
vote on the appointed day. The slate of electors associated with the candi-
date who claims to have won the national popular vote could meet and
127. See 3 U.S.C. § 2 (“Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of
choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the elec-
tors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such
State may direct.”). Some contend that once a state legislature has given the people the
right to vote for President, that right is fundamental, and therefore the legislature cannot
override the will of the people by appointing electors to do something different after the
fact. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316
(2020) (No. 19-465) (statement of Mr. Purcell). But see id. at 56 (agreeing that it would
probably be permissible if the legislature made clear in advance that the public vote was
entirely advisory). Even if one accepts that argument, it does not follow that this statute is
unavailable if the people failed to make a choice on Election Day; there is then nothing to
override, and the alternative may be that the state gets no representation in the electoral
vote. Moreover, acceptance of this argument could present another challenge for advocates
of the compact: If the people of a state have a (legislatively created) fundamental right to
vote for how a state’s electoral votes are cast, does it dilute that fundamental right to
authorize voters from other states to participate in voting for how a state’s electoral votes
are cast?
128. There is also the possibility of a division within the state executive in states that
lack a unitary executive.
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vote. So, too, could the slate of electors associated with the candidate
who claims to have won the vote in the state.
Competing slates of electors might meet and vote even without post-
election legislative appointment. That’s because the presidential candi-
dates might foresee the possibility of prevailing in litigation after the
meeting and voting of the electors but before the electoral votes are
counted on January 6 in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.129 Or the candidates might foresee the possibility of pre-
vailing when the Senate and House meet if some electoral votes are
rejected.
D. THE MEETING OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE
The Electoral Count Act establishes standards and procedures to apply
to the counting.130 It generally calls for the result of any decision reached
prior to the closing of the safe harbor pursuant to preexisting law to be
accepted, but even then, it allows for the two houses concurrently to re-
ject votes not “regularly given by the electors.”131 In the absence of a
decision reached prior to the closing of the safe harbor, if the House and
the Senate disagree about which of multiple returns to count, the Electo-
ral Count Act states that the return certified by the state executive shall
be counted.132 These provisions—especially the latter—give plenty of
room to debate both the constitutionality of the National Popular Vote
Compact and the legitimacy of the way any particular state conducted its
presidential election.
It might be thought that the Senate and the House have no authority
whatsoever to reject electoral votes. But even the narrowest view of their
authority would have to concede the authority to reject votes that are not
from a state—but instead (say) from a group of self-appointed individuals
or a foreign nation—and the authority to decide which of multiple re-
turns from a single state is the legitimate one.133 Lest this seem fanciful,
over the years the House and the Senate have decided multiple chal-
lenges to electoral votes, including considering whether a return was from
a state and which of multiple returns from a single state to count.134
More dramatically, the House and Senate have rejected electoral votes
based on the conclusion that the states were not republican, and thus in
129. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The January 6 date is set by 3 U.S.C. § 15. In some
years, Congress sets a different date. See, e.g., Date for Counting 2012 Electoral Votes in
Congress, Pub. L. No. 112-228, 126 Stat. 1610 (2012) (establishing January 4, 2013, for the
2012 election).
130. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2018).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1653, 1795 (2002) (“Under even the ‘thinnest’ conception of the counting function, the
joint convention [of the House and Senate] must judge the authenticity of the electoral
certificate, distinguishing between what is merely the legal equivalent of a Publishers
Clearinghouse sweepstakes entry and what is a bona fide electoral certificate.”).
134. See id. at 1680–94 (recounting the history of these incidents).
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violation of the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution.135 In that instance,
the House and Senate acted by law, presenting the bill to President Lin-
coln for his signature or veto. Lincoln signed it in deference to the House
and Senate, but clearly stated that, in his view,
[T]he two Houses of Congress, convened under the twelfth article of
the Constitution, have complete power to exclude from counting all
electoral votes deemed by them to be illegal; and it is not competent
for the Executive to defeat or obstruct that power by a veto, as
would be the case if his action were at all essential in the matter.136
Is there something unique about the Guarantee Clause, or may (must?)
the votes of electors who were selected in violation of other constitutional
provisions also be rejected? I suggest that the votes of electors who were
selected pursuant to an unconstitutional process should also be rejected.
Imagine a state enacted a statute providing that its presidential electors
would be white, male, Roman Catholic priests selected by the Pope—thus
violating the Equal Protection Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the
Religious Test Clause.137 Is there any doubt that the vote of electors so
chosen should not be counted?
This does not necessarily mean that the votes of individual electors may
be rejected by the House and the Senate because that vote was cast un-
constitutionally. For example, if an elector votes for someone under the
age of thirty-five, or votes for a President and Vice President who were
both citizens of the elector’s state, it may be that the House and Senate
have no authority to refuse to count the vote.138 And perhaps each state’s
electoral college has conclusive authority to determine whether individ-
ual electors are disqualified.139 But each state’s electoral college must not
be able to determine conclusively whether the law that provided for its
appointment is constitutional. It is one thing for an admittedly valid body
to judge the qualifications of individual members, but if the legality of the
body as a whole is in question, it would be the purest of bootstrapping for
it to have conclusive authority to determine its own legitimacy.
We can expect that some members of Congress will contend that the
National Popular Vote Compact is unconstitutional and will seek to reject
any votes from electors appointed pursuant to that compact. Under the
135. See id. at 1797; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guaran-
tee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
136. Kesavan, supra note 133, at 1797 (citing HOUSE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, COUNTING
ELECTORAL VOTES, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 44-13, at 229–30 (1877)).
137. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, I; id. art. VI, cl. 3.
138. See Kesavan, supra note 133, at 1805 (making this argument).
139. Id. at 1802 (arguing that elector ineligibility, such as the prohibition on members of
Congress and those holding office under the United States being electors, cannot be en-
forced by the House and Senate, because “the elector ineligibility problem is impossible to
resolve without knowing the persons voted for” and the House and Senate “may not judge
the acts of electors”). Kesavan writes broadly that the House and Senate “may not judge
the manner of appointment . . . of electors,” but he does not address the kind of defect in
the manner of appointment that would render the appointment of all electors in that state
unconstitutional. Id.
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Electoral Count Act, if litigation has reached a final decision prior to the
closing of the safe harbor, that result must be accepted unless both houses
of Congress concurrently reject the votes as not “regularly given by the
electors.”140 Alternatively, if there are multiple returns from a state, and
the House and the Senate disagree about which of multiple returns to
count, the Electoral Count Act states that the return certified by the state
executive shall be counted.141 Under these rules, particularly in our
hyper-polarized political environment, it might be crucial whether the
House and the Senate are both controlled by the same party.
This assumes that the Electoral Count Act itself is binding. But it cer-
tainly cannot bind a future Congress acting by law. To the extent that an
earlier Congress may validly pass a statute, a later Congress can amend it,
either generally or for a particular occasion. Indeed, the Electoral Count
Act itself has been amended for particular electoral counts.142
The Electoral Count Act may not even bind the Senate and the House
of Representatives acting without the President. That’s because any rules
governing the procedure in the Senate and the House may be in the
hands of the Senate and the House, rather than something that can be
controlled by a law subject to presidential presentment and possible
veto.143 If that’s right, then the House and the Senate could change the
process dictated by the Electoral Count Act without the involvement of
the President—a feature that may be crucial if Congress and the presi-
dency are held by different parties. The incumbent President is the one
who would matter, whether or not that person is also a candidate.
Moreover, the Electoral Count Act’s provision for concurrent action
by the Senate and the House acting separately may be unconstitutional.
There is a powerful argument that the Constitution views the joint meet-
ing of the Senate and the House of Representatives as its own body so
that any vote to be taken by the body should be taken in that body as a
unicameral whole—not the Senate and the House of Representatives vot-
ing separately.144 That voting rule would make crucial the party division
in Congress as a whole, rather than the party division in each house.
One final complication: the Electoral Count Act, by setting the date for
the joint meeting on January 6, provides for the newly elected Congress—
elected in November and assumed office on January 3—to resolve objec-
tions to the electoral votes. But neither Article Two nor the Twelfth
Amendment explicitly so provide. Nor does the Twentieth Amendment,
which, by moving the starting date of congressional and presidential
terms from March until January, was designed to eliminate lame duck
140. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2018).
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 122, 112th Cong., 126 Stat. 1610 (2012) (changing the date of
the meeting to count the electoral vote in January 2013 but otherwise leaving January 6 as
the date for future meetings).
143. Kesavan, supra note 133, at 1779–87.
144. See id. at 1720–29, 1792–93 (marshalling evidence and arguing for unicameralism).
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sessions of Congress but failed to do so.145 Thus, it is possible that the
outgoing lame duck Congress might move the meeting to a date prior to
January 3, claiming for itself the power to resolve objections to the electo-
ral vote. The outgoing Congress has already moved the date, each on a
one-time basis, on five different occasions since 1984, albeit never earlier
than January 4.146
To recap: Under the National Popular Vote Compact, states will, for
the first time ever, have a role in determining which electors are ap-
pointed in other states, giving them a new incentive to run up the vote for
a state’s favored candidate and depress the vote for a state’s disfavored
candidate. These incentives may be hard to resist in states dominated by a
single party, and in our hyper-partisan political culture, states will be sus-
pected of mischief even if they do not engage in any. Once that happens,
there will be pressure in member states to resist awarding electoral votes
in accordance with the popular vote, and competing slates of electors may
meet and vote. Battles over the constitutionality, enforceability, and
proper interpretation of the compact can erupt in state legislatures, a va-
riety of courts, and in the House of Representatives and Senate, under
enormous time pressure and considerable uncertainty—not only with re-
gard to these issues but also with regard to the rules that govern in the
joint meeting of the House and Senate, and even whether the lame duck
or the new House and Senate are the ones to judge the electoral returns.
Perhaps all of this can be avoided if the relevant actors behave with
restraint and adherence to tradition. Perhaps we can rely on existing
practices and the Electoral Count Act to serve as a precommitment from
which political actors dare not depart.147 But in an era that has seen, for
example, the abolition of the filibuster for nominations to executive and
inferior judicial offices, the refusal to consider a Supreme Court nominee,
and the abolition of the filibuster for Supreme Court nominations, how
145. See John Copeland Nagle, Lame Duck Logic, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1177,
1180–82 (2012); John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 470, 483 (1997).
146. Date for Counting 2012 Electoral Votes in Congress, Pub. L. No. 112-228, § 1, 126
Stat. 1610, 1610 (2012) (setting January 4, 2013); Date for Counting 2008 Electoral Votes in
Congress, Pub. L. No. 110-430, § 2, 122 Stat. 4846, 4846 (2008) (setting January 8, 2009);
Date for Counting 1996 Electoral Votes in Congress, Pub. L. No. 104-296, § 2, 110 Stat.
3558, 3558 (1996) (setting January 9, 1997); Changing the Date for the Counting of the
Electoral Vote by Congress to January 4, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-646, 102 Stat. 3341 (1988)
(setting January 4, 1989); Changing the Date for the Counting of the Electoral Votes in
1985, Pub. L. No. 98-456, 98 Stat. 1748 (1984) (setting January 7, 1985). Cf. WEGMAN, supra
note 46 (asserting, without mentioning the relevant statutes governing the time to count
electoral votes (or the Twentieth Amendment), that if there is a contingent election in the
House upon the failure of any presidential candidate to receive a majority of the electoral
vote, “the presidency is decided by the outgoing, lame-duck House, not the incoming
one”).
147. Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitu-
tion’s Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215, 227 (1994) (calling those who are concerned
about a future Congress (or a future joint meeting of the House and Senate) “spoilsports
and worrywarts” and defending proposed legislation regarding the counting of electoral
votes as serving “a precommitment and focal point”). Cf. Kesavan, supra note 133, at 1783
(“Call me a worrywart . . . .”).
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can anyone be confident of restraint and adherence to tradition and
precommitments?
Such behavior seems likely to be in even shorter supply in the coming
years. On the Democratic side, presidential candidates in the primary
called for expanding the size of the Supreme Court and the abolition of
the filibuster generally.148 On the Republican side is an incumbent presi-
dent running for reelection after impeachment. Advocates of the Presi-
dent’s conviction argued, in formal filings in the Senate as a Court of
Impeachment, that the President must be removed from office because
otherwise “he will continue to endanger our national security, jeopardize
the integrity of our elections, and undermine our core constitutional prin-
ciples.”149 By contrast, the President’s formal answer in the Court of Im-
peachment called the articles of impeachment “a brazen and unlawful
attempt to overturn the results of the 2016 election and interfere with the
2020 election,” and “a dangerous attack on the American people them-
selves and their fundamental right to vote.”150 The first day of proceed-
ings in the Court of Impeachment included a House manager accusing
senators of “voting for a cover-up” and defense counsel accusing the
manager of making false allegations and telling him that he “should be
embarrassed.”151 In closing arguments, House Manager Schiff stated,
“You can’t trust this President to do the right thing, not for one minute,
not for one election, not for the sake of our country. You just can’t. He
will not change, and you know it.”152 And Deputy Counsel to the Presi-
148. See Bob Egelko, Democratic Candidates Propose Bigger Supreme Court to Counter
“Theft of Judiciary”, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 13, 2020, 6:37 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
nation/article/Democratic-candidates-propose-bigger-Supreme-14972607.php [https://
perma.cc/H5MJ-R49E]; Burgess Everett, Warren Calls for Ending the Filibuster, POLITICO
(Apr. 5, 2019, 11:42 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/05/elizabeth-warren-fili-
buster-2020-election-1259196 [https://perma.cc/TN63-4F7C]. President Obama joined the
call to eliminate the filibuster if necessary to enact voting reforms. Bill Chappell, Obama
Calls For Abolishing Filibuster If It Stands in Way of Stronger Voting Rights, NPR (July 30,
2020, 4:11 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/
07/30/897283395/obama-calls-for-abolishing-filibuster-if-it-stands-in-way-of-stronger-vot-
ing-rig [https://perma.cc/6HZ9-9Q3E] (quoting President Obama as saying, “And if all this
takes eliminating the filibuster—another Jim Crow relic—in order to secure the God-given
rights of every American, then that’s what we should do.”).
149. Trial Memorandum of U.S. House of Representatives at 46, In re Impeachment of
President Donald J. Trump (Jan. 18, 2020) (Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment); see
also id. at 45 (“The Senate should convict and remove President Trump to avoid serious
and long-term damage to our democratic values and the Nation’s security.”).
150. Answer of President Donald J. Trump at 1, 6, In re Impeachment of President
Donald J. Trump (Jan. 18, 2020) (Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment).
151. See Paul LeBlanc, Roberts Scolds Legal Teams after Tense Exchange: “Those Ad-
dressing The Senate Should Remember Where They Are”, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 22, 2020,
1:54 AM), https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-impeachment-trial-01-21-20/
h_2a37eba710285d140f5643cd25d8bda0 [https://perma.cc/LD4G-8WP2]. The exchange led
Chief Justice Roberts to admonish both sides to “remember that they are addressing the
world’s greatest deliberative body,” where “members avoid speaking in a manner and us-
ing language that is not conducive to civil discourse.” Id. Less formal communication ques-
tioned the patriotism of members of the House, called witnesses human scum, and
described the impeachment inquiry as a witch hunt and kangaroo court.
152. 166 CONG. REC. S788 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (statement of House Manager
Schiff).
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dent stated, “This was a purely partisan, political process. . . . It was done
by a process that was not designed to persuade anyone[,] or to get to the
truth[,] or to provide process and abide by past precedents.”153
These polarized positions were not limited to the advocates. At the
close of the trial, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell stated that
“‘the demon of faction’ has been on full display, but now it is time for
him, the demon, to exit the stage. We have indeed witnessed an abuse of
power—a grave abuse of power—by just the kind of House majority that
the Framers warned us about.”154 The Minority Leader, Chuck Schumer,
responded,
[T]his is the first impeachment trial of a President[,] or impeachment
trial of anybody else[,] that was completed that has no witnesses and
no documents. . . . [T]he idea that . . . you shouldn’t have witnesses
and documents, when we are doing something as august, as impor-
tant as an impeachment trial, fails the laugh test. It makes people
believe—correctly, in my judgment—that the administration, its top
people, and Senate Republicans are all hiding the truth. They are
afraid of the truth.155
Add to the mix the use of social media by foreign governments to
spread misinformation, and the idea of counting on restraint and adher-
ence to tradition and precommitments seems Pollyannaish.156
E. NATIONAL CONTROL
Some might say that there is an easy solution to these nightmare scena-
rios: national control over presidential elections. Control over eligibility
would not be enough to deal with the other mechanics of elections, such
as registration and identification requirements, that can be used to in-
crease or decrease voters. National control over these mechanics would
be necessary to guard against state manipulation as well. And even these
would not control fraud by state officials (or fraud that state officials ig-
nore). Indeed, one of the earliest proponents of coordinated state action
to rely on a national popular vote has explained:
To avoid chaos and catastrophic confusion, the uniform and inter-
locking state laws enacted under the NPVIC will need to be supple-
mented by a comprehensive congressional statute providing detailed
federal oversight of the presidential election process in all states—
not merely the states that enact the [compact]. Such a statute could
be rooted in Congress’s power to pass all laws “necessary and
proper” to vindicate Congress’s role in overseeing interstate com-
153. Id. at S782 (statement of Mr. Counsel Philbin).
154. 166 CONG. REC. S814–15 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
155. Id. at S815 (statement of Sen. Schumer).
156. But see Akhil Reed Amar, The Inaugural Abraham Lincoln Lecture on Constitu-
tional Law: Electoral College Reform, Lincoln-Style, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 77–78 (2017)
(advocating a public and solemn pledge by the presidential candidates, and their running
mates, to abide by the national popular vote, and contending that reneging by a presiden-
tial candidate would be stopped by his party, his running mate, and his own electors).
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pacts under Article I, Section 10, and also in Congress’s power to
regulate the “Manner” of congressional elections under Article I,
Section 4. (One part of a standardized ballot that Congress could
lawfully mandate for House and Senate elections could include a
standardized section for each voter to register her presidential pref-
erence; and this standardized section could be monitored and admin-
istered by federal election officials working alongside their state
election-law counterparts.)157
It is hard to see how congressional power to implement a compact
would apply if the compact were not approved by Congress in the first
place. Even if Congress did approve, it is far from clear that such a power
would extend to controlling elections in non-member states.158 It is also
far from clear that the power to control the manner of congressional elec-
tions extends to mandating a standardized section for presidential prefer-
ence—that would seem to ignore that the power is textually limited to
congressional elections and does not extend to presidential elections. As
Justice Harlan explained:
Even the power to control the “Manner” of holding elections, given
with respect to congressional elections by Art. I, § 4, is absent with
respect to the selection of presidential electors. And, of course, the
fact that it was deemed necessary to provide separately for congres-
sional power to regulate the time of choosing presidential electors
and the President himself demonstrates that the power over “Times,
Places and Manner” given by Art. I, § 4, does not refer to presiden-
tial elections, but only to the elections for Congressmen. Any
shadow of a justification for congressional power with respect to con-
gressional elections therefore disappears utterly in presidential
elections.159
157. Id. at 76–77; see id. at 77 (“But enactment of this comprehensive congressional law
would require careful lawyering and broad political consensus. We should not underesti-
mate the difficulties that flank this pathway.”); see also Vikram David Amar, Response:
The Case for Reforming Presidential Elections by Subconstitutional Means: The Electoral
College, the National Popular Vote Compact, and Congressional Power, 100 GEO. L.J. 237,
252 (2011) (referring to the “dangerous gaps” in the design of the compact and “forcefully
urg[ing] Congress to supplement it with a system of uniform rules for tallying sentiment in
all fifty states”).
158. See Amar, supra note 157, at 254–55 (“Unless Congress has independent authority
to create and compel a presidential preference poll to be administered in the states, the
fact that some group of compacting states (which could be as few as two) might agree to
something should not give Congress power that otherwise falls beyond its enumerated au-
thority to impose on unwilling states.”).
159. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 211–12 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). But see Amar, supra note 157, at 256 (endorsing the
view that “Congress’s power over Presidential elections [is] coextensive with that which
Article I [S]ection 4 grants it over congressional elections” (footnote and internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (first alteration in original)). Congress has “authority to prevent cor-
ruption in national Presidential elections.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (citing
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934)); see also Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 291 (Stew-
art, J., concurring in part) (noting that “[w]hen electors are chosen by popular election, the
Federal Government has the power to assure that such elections are orderly and free from
corruption” (citing Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 534)). But there is certainly a plausible argu-
ment that the prevention-of-corruption rationale should not be interpreted so broadly as to
allow Congress to control the manner of presidential elections to the same extent that it
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Congressional control over voter eligibility is even more questionable.
In Oregon v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court did uphold—as applied to fed-
eral elections only—the constitutionality of a federal statute establishing
eighteen as the voting age.160 But there was no majority opinion.161 Writ-
ing only for himself, Justice Black relied on inherent national power to
reach this conclusion, finding “a residual power in Congress to insure that
those officers represent their national constituency as responsively as pos-
sible” to be “inherent in the very concept of a supreme national govern-
ment with national officers.”162 No other Justice expressed agreement
with this idea. Four Justices concluded that the statute was unconstitu-
tional, even as applied to federal elections.163 But the remaining four Jus-
tices, who formed a majority with Justice Black to uphold the statute as
applied to federal elections, relied on Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment and would have held the statute valid in both state and fed-
eral elections.164 In the years since Oregon v. Mitchell, the Supreme
Court has grown much more skeptical of congressional power under Sec-
tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,165 leaving considerable reason
to doubt that the current Supreme Court would uphold congressional
power to establish the qualifications for voters in presidential elections.
Those committed to having a national popular vote determine the Pres-
ident might welcome a complete federal takeover of the presidential elec-
can control congressional elections, if for no other reason than to preserve the plain textual
distinction between the two powers. And the Court has, since Buckley, adopted a narrower
view of what counts as “corruption.” See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
160. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117–18.
161. Id. at 117.
162. Id. at 124 n.7 (Black, J., announcing the judgments of the Court in an opinion
expressing his own view of the cases). He thought that it could not “be seriously contended
that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential elections than it has over
congressional elections.” Id. at 124. But as Justice Harlan observed, see supra text accom-
panying note 159, the constitutional text severely undermines that assertion. The recent
decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1403–04 (2020) (overruling Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)), is not encouraging for anyone relying on a view of the Con-
stitution adopted by a single Justice.
163. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 294 (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding it “plain . . . that the Constitution . . .
completely withholds from Congress the power to alter by legislation qualifications for
voters in federal elections”); id. at 210 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“It is difficult to see how words could be clearer in stating what Congress can control
and what it cannot control. Surely nothing in these provisions lends itself to the view that
voting qualifications in federal elections are to be set by Congress.”).
164. See id. at 135 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I rely on the
Equal Protection Clause and on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); id. at 240 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (“We would uphold § 302 as a valid exercise of congressional power under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); id. at 240 (stating that the case does not involve “an
assertion of congressional power to regulate any and all aspects of state and federal elec-
tions, or even to make general rules for the determination of voter qualifications . . . [or] to
set minimum ages for voting throughout the States”).
165. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
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tion, even if a constitutional amendment were required.166 After all, it is
the President we are electing––Why not have a truly national election?
First, partisans are not likely to trust elections run by the other party.
How many Democrats would trust an election run by a Secretary of Elec-
tions appointed by President Trump? Consider the level of confidence in
Secretary of Education DeVos, Secretary of State Tillerson, or Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development Carson. How many Republicans
would trust an election run by a Secretary of Elections appointed by Hil-
lary Clinton or Elizabeth Warren? There has been deep suspicion that the
Postmaster General was attempting to suppress voting by making voting
by mail less reliable.167 If the Postmaster General isn’t trusted to handle
ballots fairly, how would a Secretary of Elections?
Nor is a non-partisan independent agency of election experts an answer
in today’s political culture. Some would attack the constitutionality of
such an independent agency; others would view it as part of the “deep
state” of bureaucratic elites committed to thwarting popular democracy.
The former could be overcome by a constitutional amendment; the latter
would make the very difficult amendment process even harder to success-
fully navigate.
Worse, a centralized election apparatus makes it much easier for an
authoritarian to use the forms of democracy to entrench his own control.
That’s part of the recipe used by authoritarians in other nations. As
David Landau, Hannah J. Wiseman, and Samuel Wiseman have argued,
state control over elections is one of the structural safeguards that the
United States has against an authoritarian takeover.168 They note that
“manipulation of electoral rules and elections is an important tool
through which modern authoritarian regimes gain power” and that “it is
significant that the constitutional design in the United States protects a
relatively independent state structure in administering elections.”169 They
acknowledge that “the strong federalism in U.S. electoral administration
does not prevent all efforts to tilt the electoral playing field,” but they
note that in “systems where movements must only capture the federal
government, an anti-democratic regime may be able to make substantial
changes to electoral laws and institutions with blinding speed.”170
166. See Richard L. Hasen, Bring On the 28th Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/opinion/sunday/voting-rights.html [https://perma.cc/
T5YS-S4GN] (calling for a constitutional amendment that “would guarantee all adult citi-
zens the right to vote in federal elections, establish a nonpartisan administrative body to
run federal elections that would automatically register all eligible voters to vote, and im-
pose basic standards of voting access and competency for state and local elections”).
167. Emily Cochrane et al., Postal Service Suspends Changes After Outcry Over Deliv-
ery Slowdown, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/us/politics/
postal-service-suspends-changes.html [https://perma.cc/4YXG-DLBX] (“Policy changes by
the postmaster general prompted allegations that the Trump administration was trying to
disenfranchise voters before the 2020 election.”).
168. Landau et al., supra note 21, at 1192.
169. Id. at 1220.
170. Id. at 1224–25; see also id. at 1225 (“Anti-democratic change in the states is likely
to be slower, unavailable in opposition-held states, and vulnerable to federal challenge
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Indirect election of the President through a series of state-based electo-
ral colleges may not be ideal, but it confines the mischief that any state
can do to the electors allocated to that state. In a nation with a highly
polarized political culture, and in a world of authoritarian governments
using the forms of democracy to take control, that is no small
accomplishment.171
VI. THE PROPORTIONAL ALTERNATIVE
If the National Popular Vote Compact courts disaster, and state control
over the machinery of presidential elections is an important safeguard
against authoritarianism, is there nothing that can be done to improve
our system of electing a president? No.
A. PROPORTIONAL ALLOCATION
State control can be maintained, and any state mischief contained, by
abandoning the winner-take-all system used in all but two states and in-
stead adopting proportional allocation of electors in each state.
Professor Katherine Florey has persuasively argued that winner-take-
all is the least defensible feature of our current electoral college sys-
tem.172 While critics often focus on the advantage given to small states by
the explicit (and deliberate) constitutional provision for two senatorial
electors for each state, “the benefit it confers upon small states is modest
and generally overwhelmed by the impact of winner-take-all.”173 By con-
unless the federal judiciary has already been captured. Such a delay can provide crucial
breathing space in which a move toward authoritarianism can be defeated.”).
171. It also means that a disaster in a state—whether a viral outbreak, hurricane, or
anything else that drastically reduces the number of people who can vote in a state in a
presidential election—does not cause a state and its voters to lose their proportionate
power in the Union. If the disaster hits supporters of one candidate more than another, of
course, it might affect which candidate wins that state’s electors. But, again, that impact is
limited to the electors allocated to that state. By contrast, if a disaster strikes a populous
state, it could have a much greater impact on the national popular vote. For example,
California’s fifty-five electors are a bit more than 10% of the total 538 electors, and its 14
million votes cast in 2016 were just a bit more than 10% of the total 136 million votes cast
nationwide. But if a disaster in California resulted in only 2 million people voting in Cali-
fornia (with no change in other states), then its proportion of the popular votes would fall
to less than 2%. Even if that disaster hit the California supporters of all candidates equally,
California’s voice in a presidential election based on popular vote would be dramatically
reduced.
172. Katherine Florey, Losing Bargain: Why Winner-Take-All Vote Assignment Is the
Electoral College’s Least Defensible Feature, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 317, 366 (2017); see
KEYSSAR, supra note 31, at 3 (observing that “politicians and political observers of diverse
stripes have lamented on the impact of [winner-take-all] on presidential elections and re-
peatedly pressed for reforms that would get rid of it”). The one state, one vote rule for
contingent elections in the House of Representatives, U.S. CONST. amend. XII, may be
even less defensible. See KEYSSAR, supra note 31, at 3 (“Even more widely disparaged than
winner-take-all has been the ‘contingent election system’—the constitutional procedure for
deciding an election when no candidate has won a majority of the nation’s electoral
votes.”). But because it applies only when the electors fail to produce a majority, it can be
treated as subsequent to and outside of the electoral college system itself.
173. Florey, supra note 172, at 329. In the 2016 election, the dozen smallest states split
evenly between Hillary Clinton (Vermont, Delaware, Rhode Island, New Hampshire,
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trast, “the winner-take-all system evolved haphazardly at the state level,
as a function of decisions by individual states designed to preserve their
influence, rather than collective deliberation,” and it “stands out for the
force of its influence on results.”174 In addition, winner-take-all allocation
has other “pernicious effects,” such as “caus[ing] candidates to focus re-
sources and visits on a handful of close states, while slighting or com-
pletely ignoring the others,” which “effectively depriv[es] consistent
political minorities within a state of any representation in the presidential
election[;] . . . arbitrarily mak[ing] residents of some states disproportion-
ately influential”; and “creat[ing] significant incentives to engage in state-
level fraud . . . or efforts at voter suppression” in battleground states.175
Proportional allocation of electors could be done by states acting inde-
pendently. But this is extremely unlikely because the very same dynamic
of interstate competition for influence that led states to adopt winner-
take-all in the first place will almost certainly prevent states from aban-
doning it. It is not surprising that the only two states that do not have
winner-take-all allocation today are small states—Maine with four elec-
tors and Nebraska with five176—that are unlikely to amass much power
by creating a single bloc of votes. An attempt to do so by an act of Con-
gress or a compact between the states would run into many (but not all)
of the difficulties discussed above, plus others—most notably trying to set
the threshold for a compact to go into effect. Unlike the National Popular
Vote Compact, it would not do to have it go into effect once agreed to by
states controlling a majority of electors because those electors would not
all be allocated to a single candidate.
For these reasons, a constitutional amendment would be the way to
achieve a proportional allocation of electors.177 Some might think this
Maine, Hawaii) and Donald Trump (Wyoming, North Dakota, Alaska, South Dakota,
Montana, Idaho). Who Won the 2016 US Presidential Election—Live Results, CBS NEWS
(Nov. 10, 2016, 5:42 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/presidential-election-2016-re-
sults-live-updates/ [https://perma.cc/FFU4-P6SF]. In addition, the solidly Democratic Dis-
trict of Columbia effectively has two senatorial electors, even though it has no senators,
because it is entitled to electors calculated as if it were a state. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII;
see Louis Jacobson, Electoral College Outlook Gives Biden Decisive Lead Over Trump,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 9, 2020, 3:09 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/elec-
tions/articles/2020-07-09/biden-takes-decisive-lead-over-trump-in-electoral-college-outlook
[https://perma.cc/A5RF-PPUR] (classifying the District of Columbia as a “safe demo-
cratic” state).
174. Florey, supra note 172, at 322.
175. Id. at 323–24 (footnotes omitted). Those troubled by political gerrymandering
should be especially troubled by winner-take-all. See KEYSSAR, supra note 31, at 137 (“But
if we condemn the gerrymander because it lessens the representation of the minority, what
is to be said of a system which excludes the minority from any representation whatever?”
(quoting Governor Edwin Winans of Michigan)).
176. See Distribution of Electoral Votes, supra note 65.
177. Litigation challenging the constitutionality of winner-take-all has also been at-
tempted but has not been successful. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Newsom, No. 18-56281, 2020
WL 5361884 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2020); Baten v. McMaster, 967 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2020) (as
amended); Lyman v. Baker, 954 F.3d 351 (1st Cir. 2020); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Abbott, 951 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2020). It appears that the strategy is to bring
similar cases around the county in the hope of creating a circuit split. A split has not mate-
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impossible in our current political culture. And they may be right. Our
history is littered with failed attempts to allocate electors proportionally
or by district.178 On the other hand, while proportional allocation of elec-
tors in any given state may have obvious partisan advantages (another
reason it is unlikely to be adopted by independent action of individual
states), it does not across the country, particularly if adopted sufficiently
in advance of any particular presidential election. Republicans in New
York and California would cast meaningful votes for President, as would
Democrats in Texas. Abolishing the senatorial electors may be impossible
if small states refuse to give up that modest advantage, but the only states
that would clearly be disadvantaged by a move to proportional allocation
of electors would be a handful of battleground states.
B. MODIFYING THE LESSIG PROPOSAL
Professor Lawrence Lessig has proposed a constitutional amendment
that would allocate each state’s electoral votes proportionally. He views
the proposal as a second-best solution compared to a national popular
vote.179 For the reasons explained above, I think it is a better solution
than a national popular vote, but I suggest a few revisions.
1. “Electors for President and Vice-President shall vote as directed by
state law.”
Lessig hoped for a Supreme Court decision upholding elector indepen-
dence as the trigger for public interest in the amendment, so it makes
sense that he leads with this provision.180 But as a drafting matter, it
would probably be more sensibly placed later in the amendment, after
provisions dealing with the allocation of electors. More substantively, it
would be better to directly and straightforwardly reject elector indepen-
dence and adopt the principle that electors must vote for the candidate to
whom they are pledged.
Chiafalo does not moot the importance of this provision. Although
Chiafalo empowers a state to impose this requirement on its electors, it
does not oblige any state to do so.181 Some might fear this provision could
result in electors having to vote for candidates who have died between
Election Day and the day the electors vote. Chiafalo acknowledged “how
rialized yet, although Judge Wynn dissented in Baten, 967 F.3d at 361 (Wynn, J.,
dissenting).
178. See KEYSSAR, supra note 31.
179. See John Laidler, End the Electoral College?, HARV. GAZETTE (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/10/harvard-panel-debates-effectiveness-of-
electoral-college/ [https://perma.cc/EV36-CN2B]. The full text of the Lessig proposal,
which can be seen on a presentation available at this site, is reproduced in the appendix.
180. See Lessig, Who Argued on Behalf of ‘Faithless Electors,’ Responds to the Supreme
Court’s Decision, HARV. L. TODAY (July 8, 2020), https://today.law.harvard.edu/lessig-
who-argued-on-behalf-of-faithless-electors-responds-to-the-supreme-courts-decision/
[https://perma.cc/PV29-M2E6].
181. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020) (“We hold that a State
may do so.” (emphasis added)).
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much turmoil such an event could cause,” and specifically noted that
“nothing in this opinion should be taken to permit the States to bind elec-
tors to a deceased candidate.”182
But that would be better than leaving to state law what electors should
do if a candidate has died, with some states requiring electors to vote as
pledged, others to vote for the candidate for Vice President to whom they
are pledged for President instead, and others leaving them to act inde-
pendently—thereby increasing the chances of a contingent election in the
House of Representatives that might result in the candidate who lost on
Election Day winning the presidency. The Twentieth Amendment already
provides a succession rule for when the President-elect has died: the Vice
President-elect becomes President.183
2. “Beginning with the next election occurring not less than 24 months
following ratification of this amendment, the Electoral Vote for
President and Vice-President within a State shall be divided
proportionally between the two persons receiving the most votes
within their State as determined by the method of tallying votes
chosen by the State, with fractions calculated to all significant digits.”
It certainly makes good sense to have sufficient time between the adop-
tion of the amendment and the first election using its process, both for
administrative feasibility and to avoid the unfairness and disruption if the
rules are changed in the middle of a campaign. In addition, the further
removed in time from the next presidential election, the opaquer the veil
obscuring the partisan impact of the change in that next election. (An
even longer delay—(say) five years—might help on this score.) As a mat-
ter of drafting, the effective date would be better placed near the end of
the amendment.184
The provision for proportional allocation is the heart of the proposal. It
leaves to state law to determine how votes are tallied, enabling states to
design the counting system in a variety of ways. By limiting electoral
182. Id. at 2328 n.8.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3; see Amar, supra note 147. I do not mean to suggest
that the apparent winner on election night is the “President-elect” under the Twentieth
Amendment. Instead, it is the vote of the electors for the deceased candidate, at least if
counted when the House and Senate meet, that makes the deceased candidate the “Presi-
dent-elect” under the Twentieth Amendment. Id. at 217–18 (“Although the legislative his-
tory of the Twentieth Amendment suggests that the electoral college winner is ‘President
elect’ the moment the electoral college votes are cast, and before they are counted in Con-
gress, the text of the Amendment fails to say this explicitly. In the absence of such explicit
language, some might argue that the formal vesting rules of Article II and the Twelfth
Amendment remain in effect, and that the Twentieth Amendment term ‘President elect’
does not apply to death prior to formal vote-counting in Congress.”). It may be wise to
make explicit that electors should vote as pledged and that these votes are to be counted,
notwithstanding the death of a candidate.
184. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing in its last sentence that it “shall not be so
construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as
part of the Constitution”); id. amend. XX, § 5 (providing in its penultimate Section that
“Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of
this article”).
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votes to the two persons receiving the most votes in the state, the propo-
sal wisely reduces (but does not eliminate) the possibility of contingent
elections in the House of Representatives that might otherwise be trig-
gered by a failure of any candidate to receive a majority of electoral votes
if all candidates received a proportional allocation of electors.
Note that it would be possible for someone to win the presidency with-
out winning a single state. In a three-way race, if some states prefer A to
B and B to C, while other states prefer C to B and B to A, B could win.
Some might find this a bug, but I think it is a feature; particularly in these
polarized times, candidate B would be far more likely to be able to unify
the country than either candidate A or C.
The Lessig proposal would also award fractional electoral votes to the
top two candidates, and it would calculate those fractions to all significant
digits. This is needlessly complex. Fractional votes themselves are a hur-
dle because electors cannot themselves be divided. This problem can be
surmounted by empowering individual electors to cast fractional votes—
the way the shareholder of a corporation can cast fractional votes corre-
sponding to the ownership of fractional shares of stock—but this requires
a departure from the easy-to-understand principle of one elector, one
vote.
Requiring that fractions be calculated to all significant digits means
that most readers will have to recall (or learn for the first time) a mathe-
matical term that functions to avoid overstating the accuracy of a mea-
surement.185 It is not clear how this concept is supposed to apply in the
context of voting, since the count of votes purports to be an exact quan-
tity, not a measured quantity—and exact numbers are considered to have
an infinite number of significant figures.186 Of course there can be errors
made in counting votes, but if calculating to all significant digits is de-
signed to take the error rate into account, it is far from clear how that is
to be done. Perhaps the intended idea is simply to do the division until
the decimal terminates in a zero or a repeating decimal, but, if so, the use
of the term “all significant digits” is misleading.
The point of calculating fractional electoral votes is to avoid creating
too large a threshold from winning one electoral vote in a state to win-
ning the next one in that state.187 For example, in a state with only three
electoral votes, it would (under typical rounding rules) take just over a
185. See Stephen L. Morgan, Tutorial on the Use of Significant Figures, U. S.C., 1, 1–7
http://www.kfupm.edu.sa/sites/phys102/AnalyticsReports/Significant-Figures.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GQ93-6F7T]. For example, if a piece of wood is measured as 5.2 inches by 3.7
inches, simply multiplying to find the area would yield 19.24 square inches. But reporting
the area as 19.24 square inches overstates the accuracy of the measurement, because when
measurements are multiplied, the answer can have no more significant digits than the least
accurate measurement. The area should be reported as 19 square inches because there are
only two significant digits in each measurement. See id. at 3.
186. See id. at 2.
187. See Claire Daviss & Rob Richie, Fuzzy Math: Wrong Way Reforms for Allocating
Electoral Votes, FAIRVOTE POL’Y 1, 14–16, 23–25 (2015), https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/
fuzzy-math-wrong-way-reforms [https://perma.cc/8XU2-YH2F].
488 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
one-sixth share (16.7%) to get one electoral vote, just over one-half to get
a second electoral vote, and over five-sixths (83.3%) to pick up the third
electoral vote. Unless the top candidate could win by a five-to-one ratio
over the second-place finisher, the second-place finisher would get one
electoral vote. Every race closer than that would be fighting over a single
electoral vote. But if fractional electoral votes are permitted, then win-
ning 80–20 is a lot better than winning 51–49.
But there is a much simpler way to achieve this end than fractional
electoral votes calculated to all significant digits: Simply multiply the
number of electors by ten. Even the smallest states would have thirty
electors, making the threshold needed to earn an additional elector vote
about 3.3%—smaller than the margin of error in polls, thereby making
every state competitive. In larger states, such thresholds would be even
smaller. Each elector would have one vote, and there would be no need
for fractional votes. Depending on the method of tallying used in a state,
rounding rules might be necessary, but rounding rules could be left to
states as part of their methods of tallying votes. Admittedly, this ap-
proach would not be as precisely proportional as fractional electoral
votes, but at least in a world with some vote-counting errors, such preci-
sion may well overstate the accuracy of the result.
And instead of red states and blue states, every state would be some
shade of purple.
3. “The Electoral Vote of each State shall be equal to the number of
Representatives times an equality factor plus the number of Senators.
That factor shall be one initially. Congress may by law, passed in
each House by a 3/4 majority, increase the factor no less than 18
months before any presidential election. Alternatively, Congress may
by law, passed in each House by a 3/4 majority, allocate electors by
State, proportionally. Once increased, the Equality Factor may not
be reduced except through the amendment of this provision. Neither
may a change to proportional allocation be reversed, except through
the amendment of this provision.”
The point of this part of the proposal is to enable Congress to gradually
reduce the significance of the senatorial electors. For several reasons, I
think it best to drop this complicated idea. First, the winner-take-all rules
are far more important than the senatorial electors. Second, seeking to
diminish the senatorial electors seems likely to prompt the opposition of
smaller states. Third, the three-quarter voting requirement makes it un-
likely ever to be used. Fourth, the three-quarter voting requirement is
greater than the two-thirds voting requirement for proposing a constitu-
tional amendment. It is certainly possible that a proposal might be able to
obtain approval by three-quarters in both the House and the Senate,
while being unable to obtain approval by two-thirds in the House and the
Senate plus ratification by three-fourths of the states, but that seems un-
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likely.188 Finally, Congress already has the power to reduce the signifi-
cance of the senatorial electors through ordinary legislation without any
supermajority requirement: simply increase the size of the House of
Representatives.189
188. Of the six constitutional amendments proposed by Congress but not ratified by the
states, it appears that only two—the Titles of Nobility Amendment and the Equal Rights
Amendment—passed Congress by a three-quarter majority in both Houses. See Birch
Bayh, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 80, 80 n.1
(1972) (House approved 354 to 23; Senate approved 84 to 8); H. JOURNAL, 11th Cong., 2d
Sess., 423 (1810) (House approved Titles of Nobility Amendment 87 to 3); S. JOURNAL,
11th Cong., 2d Sess., 506 (1810) (Senate approved Titles of Nobility Amendment 19 to 5).
And the current status of the Equal Rights Amendment is subject to controversy, now that
the thirty-eighth state has ratified, albeit after the deadline set by Congress. See Russell
Berman, Did Virginia Just Amend the Constitution?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 15, 2020), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/01/virginia-equal-rights-amendment-constitu-
tion/605002/ [https://perma.cc/8ZXY-WK6M] (“The Democratic-led legislature voted to
become the 38th and final state needed to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. But a court
battle is already under way.”); Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, 44 Op.
O.L.C. 1, 37 (2020) (concluding “that the ERA Resolution has expired and is no longer
pending before the States”). The Corwin Amendment (which would have entrenched slav-
ery) was approved 128 to 65 in the House and 24 to 12 in the Senate. H. JOURNAL, 36th
Cong., 2d Sess., 425 (1861); S. JOURNAL, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., 383 (1861). The Child Labor
Amendment passed by a vote of 297 to 68 in the House, and 61 to 23 in the Senate. Sey-
mour Moskowitz, Dickens Redux: How American Child Labor Law Became A Con Game,
10 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 89, 134 (2010). The District of Columbia Statehood
Amendment passed by a vote of 289 to 127 in the House, and 67 to 32 in the Senate.
Johnny Barnes, Towards Equal Footing: Responding to the Perceived Constitutional, Legal
and Practical Impediments to Statehood for the District of Columbia, 13 U.D.C. L. REV. 1,
37 nn.313–14 (2010). It does not appear that the House or Senate conducted a roll call vote
on the final package of the original proposed amendments to the Constitution, which in-
cluded the Congressional Apportionment Amendment.
189. As a constitutional matter, the House could consist of more than ten thousand
representatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Number of Representatives shall not
exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representa-
tive . . . .”). One of the constitutional amendments approved by Congress and sent to the
states but never ratified would have changed this formula so that once the nation’s popula-
tion grew enough, “the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not
be less than two hundred Representatives, nor more than one Representative for every
fifty thousand persons.” 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 321–22 (1894). If that had been ratified, the maximum size of
the House would currently be about six thousand six hundred. Some—including, unfortu-
nately, whoever is responsible for the Senate’s website, Congress Submits the First Consti-
tutional Amendments to the States, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/minute/Congress_Submits_1st_Amendments_to_States.htm [https://perma.cc/
AM2N-VFZT]—erroneously think that this amendment would require the House to be
that size. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional
Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 698 n.66 (1993) (noting the
error by another author and correctly stating that the amendment “would impose a maxi-
mum number of Representatives based on population size, not a minimum. The minimum
would be fixed at 200. Congress would retain authority to regulate the actual number,
provided it is greater than 200 and less than the maximum of one per 50,000 in popula-
tion . . . . ”). This error evidently treats the word “more” as if it were the word “less.”
Although earlier versions did use the word “less,” it was changed before final passage in
Congress to “more.” See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 948 (1789); see also The Bill of Rights: A
Transcription, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-
transcript [https://perma.cc/D48A-ZGAQ]. Jesse Wegman asserts that the amendment
would require “a House of nearly 11,000 members” today, WEGMAN, supra note 46, at 185,
an error that apparently is based on reading the first part of the proposed amendment
(which requires the House to have no less than one member for every forty thousand
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4. “If no person shall receive a majority of the Electoral Vote, then the
House of Representatives shall choose immediately by roll call vote
from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding two on
the list of those voted for as President and Vice-President. In casting
their vote, each representative shall have one vote for each office.
The President and Vice-President shall be the persons receiving the
most votes.”
This would change the voting rule in any contingent election in the
House so that states would no longer vote as states, but instead, individ-
ual representatives would vote.190 In addition, it would move any contin-
gent election of the Vice President from the Senate to the House.
It does not, however, make clear that the incoming House rather than
the outgoing House should make the decision. This should be clarified in
addition to clarifying that it is the incoming House and Senate that re-
ceive the electoral vote returns.
5. “This Amendment shall become operative upon ratification by 38
state conventions.”
The valuable contribution here is to specify ratification by conven-
tion—as was done for the repeal of prohibition191—rather than by state
legislatures. But it should not refer to the number thirty-eight, because
the number of states might change before it is ratified.
If adopted, such an amendment would eliminate the biggest problem of
our current electoral college system while avoiding the dangers of a na-
tional popular vote. It would confine the mischief of each state to that
state, thereby reducing the incentives for such mischief, and make every
state relevant to presidential elections.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is an undeniable attraction to abandoning the use of presidential
electors and moving to a national popular vote. If President Donald
Trump gets reelected while again losing the popular vote, the outcry for
popular election will be loud.
Nevertheless, in today’s hyper-partisan political culture, moving to na-
tional popular elections while leaving control of voting qualifications and
procedures to the states invites disaster. The supposed cure of national
control over voting would make matters worse by destroying an impor-
tant protection against authoritarianism.
persons) but ignoring that this provision does not apply once the House reaches two hun-
dred members.
190. While this would significantly reduce the power of small states in a contingent
election in the House, no such election has been held in nearly two hundred years, and
even strong advocates for small states would have a difficulty defending an attempt to cling
to this power. See WEGMAN, supra note 46, at 179 (“Today you would be hard pressed to
find anyone who defends it.”).
191. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 3.
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Replacing the winner-take-all allocation of each state’s electors with
proportional allocation of electors in each state eliminates the worst fea-
ture of our current electoral college system and makes many more voters
relevant in a presidential election. It also preserves state control over
elections, making it harder for would-be authoritarians to take over the
administration of elections and entrench themselves.
Proportional allocation of electors within each state will not overcome
the deep divisions in our nation. But unlike a national popular vote, it is




1. Electors for President and Vice-President shall vote as directed by
state law.
2. Beginning with the next election occurring not less than 24 months
following ratification of this amendment, the Electoral Vote for President
and Vice-President within a State shall be divided proportionally between
the two persons receiving the most votes within their State as determined
by the method of tallying votes chosen by the State, with fractions calcu-
lated to all significant digits.
3. The Electoral Vote of each State shall be equal to the number of
Representatives times an Equality Factor plus the number of Senators.
That factor shall be one initially. Congress may by law, passed in each
House by a 3/4ths majority, increase the factor no less than 18 months
before any Presidential Election. Alternatively, Congress may by law,
passed in each House by a 3/4ths majority, allocate electors by state, pro-
portionally. Once increased, the Equality Factor may not be reduced ex-
cept through the amendment of this provision. Neither may a change to
proportional allocation be reversed, except through the amendment of
this provision.
4. If no person shall receive a majority of the Electoral Vote, then the
House of Representatives shall choose immediately by roll call vote from
the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding two on the list of
those voted for as President and Vice-President. In casting their vote,
each representative shall have one vote for each office. The President and
Vice-President shall be the persons receiving the most votes.
5. This Amendment shall become operative upon ratification by 38
state conventions.
192. Lawrence Lessig, Professor, Harv. L. Sch., The Electoral College: Keynote
Luncheon with Lawrence Lessig and Stuart Stevens (Oct. 21, 2019).
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B. LESSIG PROPOSAL MODIFIED BY HARTNETT
1. Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a number of electors, equal to ten times the whole number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress. The District constituting the seat of government of the United
States shall, for purposes of this amendment, be treated as if it were a
State.
2. Electors shall pledge themselves to vote for particular candidates
for President and Vice President.
3. Electors shall be appointed proportionately between the two per-
sons receiving the most votes for President and Vice President within
each State as determined by the method of tallying votes chosen by each
State.
4. Electors, once appointed, shall vote for the candidates to whom
they are pledged. These votes shall be cast as required, and treated as
valid, notwithstanding a candidate’s death, in which case the provisions of
the third section of the Twentieth Amendment shall then apply.
5. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall assemble no
sooner than noon on the third day of January to count the votes of the
electors. The person having the greatest number of votes for President,
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number
of electors appointed, and the person having the greatest number of votes
as Vice President, shall be the Vice President, if such number be a major-
ity of the whole number of Electors appointed. But if, after the Senate
and House of Representative have assembled in accordance with this par-
agraph, no person has received a majority of the Electoral vote, then the
House of Representatives shall choose immediately by roll call vote from
the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding two on the list of
those voted for as President and Vice President. Each Representative
shall have one vote for each office. The President and Vice President
shall be the persons receiving the most votes.
6. This amendment shall govern elections held more than [two] years
following the ratification of this article.
7. This amendment shall be inoperative unless it shall have been rati-
fied as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in three-fourths
of the several States.
